SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN SUBGROUPS FROM SUPERORDINATE GROUP POLLS

BY

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Abstract

Polling can influence public opinion—polls convey normative information people are motivated to follow. Polls are often presented as reflecting the larger population (superordinate group)—frequently representing high-status subgroups. Marginalized groups are treated as exceptions to the norm in need of explanation. The current work examines if low-status subgroup members perceive their group as represented in national polls and the consequences of perceived representation for following superordinate group norms (bandwagoning). I expected: 1) Low-status subgroup members would identify with the superordinate group less than high-status subgroup members, 2) Low-status subgroup members would perceive less subgroup representation in national polls than high-status subgroup members, 3) Low-status subgroup members would be less likely than high-status subgroup members to bandwagon, 4) Norm adherence would depend on perceived representation and identification, with low-status subgroup members bandwagoning less than high-status subgroups members to the extent they see their group as underrepresented and less identified with the superordinate group, and 5) Subgroups would be less likely to bandwagon when the issue was relevant to the group's interests. Participants viewed a national poll in which the majority of respondents either supported or opposed a position (Studies 1-2). Participants rated support for the issue and perception of racial groups' representation in the poll. In Study 3, participants viewed a similar poll, but viewed poll sample gender composition information—either women or men were a majority of respondents. In all studies, low-status (vs. high-status) subgroup members had equal (Studies 1-3) or higher (Study 2A) national identification. Participants viewed low-status subgroup members as less represented than high-status subgroups (Studies 1-2) or perceived representation as manipulated (Study 3). Reliable general bandwagon effects emerged in all three

studies. Counter to expectations, low-status subgroup members bandwagoned equally to or *more* than high-status subgroups members (Studies 1-3; but see exceptions Study 2A/B). Perceived subgroup representation did not reliably influence bandwagoning (Studies 1-3). In Study 3, women were more likely to bandwagon and perceived relevance decreased bandwagoning compared to men for a less gender-relevant issue. Results offered mixed support for hypotheses—subgroup representation did not reliably predict bandwagoning, but relevance may help explain inconsistencies.

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Social Influence in Superordinate Groups and Subgroups

> *Black voters face a series of conundrums when voicing policy positions and choosing candidates. […] The policy preferences and desires of the black community are rarely reflected in national and state laws, with an inverse relationship between black support and a law's chance of passage. (That's true for Latinos and women as well.)*
>
> - Farai Chideya, FiveThirtyEight

Polling information helps inform politicians and the public about public opinion and potential election outcomes. Polls do not merely reflect historical trends and changes in attitudes—they can affect future attitudes. Social information is conveyed through polls people use implicitly or explicitly in forming attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Simon, 1954; Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994). People are motivated to follow attitudes and behaviors of important groups to gain approval, gain information, help the group, or compare and distinguish themselves from others (e.g. Brewer, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). But polls often express attitudes as an aggregate of a large, superordinate group. Superordinate groups, especially in terms of national identity, tend to reflect large and/or powerful demographic groups (e.g., White Americans, men; e.g., Staerklé, Sidanius, Green, & Molina, 2010; Van Berkel, Molina, & Mukherjee, 2016). Reports of polls describe the attitudes of minority groups often as the group that needs explanation—the exception to the "normative" superordinate group (e.g., the Black vote, the Latino vote, the Women's vote; e.g., Kurtzleben, 2016; Silver, 2016; Troy, 2016). The current work examines the extent to which low-status subgroup members perceived their group as represented in national polls and the consequences of this perceived representation for following the social norms of the superordinate, national group. I expect members of minority groups will view their group as less represented in a poll of superordinate group attitudes because they are less represented in the national identity and will be influenced by this information less as a result.

Bandwagoning

Polling information gives voters electoral advantages by allowing them to vote strategically—they can make decisions based on chance of success (Simon, 1954; Mutz, 1995). Polling also influences voters by providing normative information. People are more likely to vote for a candidate or policy that is leading the polls or has normative support—a position that is expected to win based on published poll data—a phenomenon referred to as bandwagoning (e.g., Fleitas, 1971; Hennessy, 1970; Nadeau, Cloutier, & Guay, 1993; Simon, 1954). When people saw polls that Bill Clinton led Bush by 17 points (but not 5 points) in the 1992 election, they preferred Clinton compared to no poll information (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994). The same pattern of results appeared when people saw information about leads in Senate and mayoral races—candidates leading polls were more likely to gain voter support. Poll information did not affect intended voter turnout. Bandwagon effects tend to be small and do not cause people to radically change behavior (e.g., intending to vote when they might not otherwise). Polls reliably shift voters toward the dominant opinion in small, but important ways.

Bandwagon effects extend beyond voting behaviors to include personal opinions. As Marsh (1984) explains, bandwagoning simply refers to the phenomenon whereby information about a majority opinion causes people to adopt the majority opinion. Polls influenced support for abortion and the sovereignty of Quebec by five to seven percent (Nadeau et al., 1993). Perceptions of collective opinion, but not personal opinions, changed after exposure to polling information and were sustained over time (Sonck & Loosveldt, 2010). However, Sonck and Loosveldt provided partial poll information (e.g., the percent of people that thought Flanders should be independent, but not the percent of people that thought it should not be independent). Exposure to public opinion caused people to shift opinions towards the majority view, but only

for issues with weaker predispositions (Rothschild & Malhotra, 2014). Bandwagoning partially depends on prior attitudes—polls are unlikely to change crystallized attitudes, but can reliably sway a voter either on the fence or with limited knowledge.

Bandwagon effects have led to concerns about reporting of early election results. Exit polls and early media projections of voting results may discourage people from voting who have not yet made it to polls (Jackson, 1983). The dissemination of early election results and polls could influence election outcomes—people will follow the actions of others and vote for a leading candidate (Skalaban, 1988). Polls, like voting, give citizens a chance to express opinions or react to politicians' actions (Moy & Rinke, 2012). Polls both bias citizens' opinions and allow citizens to influence politicians. Good polls use representative population samples, but numerically dominant groups still compose a poll majority. Polls may bias attitudes towards the position of the numerical majority and only allow the majority to express an opinion or reaction.

One reason people may support a leading candidate or position is to gain positive self-esteem from identifying with a winner—basking in reflected glory (BIRGing; Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976). People displayed signs for a winning candidate compared to a losing candidate longer after an election (Miller, 2009). In a complementary phenomenon, cutting off reflected failure (CORFing), people are more likely to distance themselves from a group when the group fails. Distancing includes avoiding group participation and avoiding symbols of group identification (Snyder, Lassegar, & Ford, 1986). People were more likely to distance themselves from a losing candidate when self-esteem was low (Miller, 2009). BIRGing and CORFing may partially explain individual motivations and consequences of bandwagoning—people gain self-esteem or avoid self-esteem loss by associating with winners and avoiding losers. BIRGing may help explain bandwagon effects—people want to be

associated with a winning group, candidate, or policy. Important social groups and identities also shape how social information is processed and used.

Social Norms and Influence

People define themselves, in part, through the groups to which they do and do not belong. Once people have been categorized, they are perceived in terms of their group and prototypes of their group (Turner et al., 1987). This process extends to the self (e.g., self-stereotyping). People assimilate themselves to a salient self-defining group, especially when the group is a numerical minority (Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Perceived similarity is both a cause and a consequence of group membership (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995; Turner et al., 1987). Groups contribute to forming an identity and to shaping attitudes, values, and behaviors.

People use social information, including group opinions, to help form opinions and attitudes. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) distinguished among normative and informational social influence. Normative influence is conformity to gain acceptance and positive evaluations from other people. Informational social influence is gaining information from others' attitudes or behaviors—people adjust attitudes to be closer to others' because others presumably provide evidence about reality. In bandwagoning, polling information may shift opinion toward a majority candidate because people want approval or because people assume the majority has information they do not. Normative influence assumes people feel social disapproval if they do not support the majority candidate or policy. Informational social influence is more likely if someone does not have strong prior opinion on the candidates or policies. The distinction between information and normative influences has largely been rejected by self-categorization researchers. Turner and colleagues (1987) argue information is only valid if it is perceived as normative, or prototypical of the group. In this sense, normative and informational influence

work together to influence attitudes. Poll information tells voters about the attitudes held by most group members and which are most socially approved. Information is valid and persuasive to the extent it is shared and stereotypically associated with an ingroup (Turner et al., 1987). Informational influence depends on the importance of the group to the self—people trust the version of reality presented by an important ingroup rather than an outgroup.

Researchers also distinguish between injunctive and descriptive norms. Descriptive norms motivate behavioral or attitudinal change through information about others' attitudes and behaviors—they characterize what most people do (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Injunctive norms change attitudes or behavior by providing information about what people *should* do. Bandwagoning and polling research largely focuses on descriptive norms—information about others' existing attitudes, but not about the injunctive standards. In general, the more people perform a behavior, the more likely others will be influenced to conform to the behavior (Milgram, Bickman, & Berkowitz, 1969). In Asch's (1952) studies of conformity, people were more likely to make errors matching lines based on length when the majority made identical errors. Social norms have the power to unintentionally increase negative behaviors if people perceive they are *surpassing* the group standard for behavior (e.g., save more energy than average; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). This boomerang effect is eliminated when descriptive norms are combined with injunctive norms because injunctive norms can indicate an extreme behavior is still approved of by the group.

Injunctive norms have been implicitly connected to bandwagoning in Noelle-Neumann's (1974) spiral of silence theory. This theory suggests one's fear of isolation and rejection by the group leads them to either support majority opinions or to remain silent in dissent. Perceptions of opinion reinforce the majority and minority opinion—those who agree with the majority speak

up, while those who dissent remain quiet. The perceived majority grows and strengthens as a dominant position while the minority declines. The more one believes others hold an opinion, the more willing they are to express similar opinions (Glyn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997). People follow the norms they perceive, even if these norms are inaccurate, and fail to express normative opinions if they are perceived as deviant (Prentice & Miller, 1993). People are encouraged to express their opinion if it is approved by the group and to stifle their opinion if it is disapproved—which strengths the perceived norm of the attitude or behavior. Bandwagon effects largely focus on descriptive norms—polls mostly describe the group—but can influence perceptions of group values indirectly.

Social Norms, Influence, and Similarity to the Group

Even if people perceive a normative opinion, there are individual differences in the extent to which people follow the majority. The degree of influence by social information from a group partially depends on group identification. People adhere to the descriptive norms of a group central to self-concept or social identity but not to behaviorally irrelevant reference groups (Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999). Group norms are only influential if people are part of the normative ingroup (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). Abrams and colleagues used Sherif's (1936) autokinetic effect paradigm to demonstrate that people were less influenced by a confederate when the confederate belonged to another group. In Abrams and colleagues extension of Asch's (1956) conformity study, people were more likely to conform to an ingroup member, especially when responses were public, rather than private. Finally, people divided into groups were less likely to have converging attitudes when it was salient that groups were categorized based on their opinions versus uncategorized (randomly assigned). People do not simply follow any group norms—but follow the norms of their ingroup,

even if the group is arbitrarily or recently formed.

Adherence to social norms of an ingroup extends to applications in marketing and policy and not just to judgments about lines and light in the lab. When consumers were primed with racial or ethnic identity, they responded more favorably to an ad with same-race compared to different-race actors (Forehand & Deshpandé, 2001; Forehand, Deshpandé, & Reed, 2002). People are likely to support a social policy when their political party supports it—even if it contradicts ideological beliefs (Cohen, 2003). Adherence to social norms does not just depending on being a member of a group—but also depends on the group's importance or centrality to the self. People with strong compared to weak ethnic identification were more likely to buy brands advertised to their racial/ethnic group (Deshpandé, Hoyer, & Donthu, 1986). People are more likely to be influenced by ingroup members—especially when they are highly identified.

However, research has shown people follow the social norms of a setting and situation—provincial norms—even when the group is irrelevant to identity (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). People were more likely to reuse hotel towels when told most past guests in the room compared to other important reference groups (i.e., citizens, men/women) reused towels. People were most likely to conform to the social group least important to identity, but most relevant to location. Meaningful social identities can be created through seemingly irrelevant similarities (e.g., hotel room number), as in the minimal group paradigm (Heider, 1958; Tajfel, 1970). Social norms are followed most when they are perceived as situationally relevant—whether it is similarity to the group performing behavior or presence in a location in which the norms were formed. Polling information may influence voting behavior less than reports of actual voting, but important groups are likely to affect attitudes and behaviors.

Social Influence as Persuasion

Elaboration Likelihood Model. Accounts of persuasion take one's context and mental state into consideration when predicting how an individual will react to attitude cues. The Elaboration-Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) argues there are two paths to persuasion, or attitude change: the central route and the peripheral route. Attitude change occurs through the central route when people carefully consider information and arguments presented. The peripheral route occur when attitude change results from reliance on simple cues—information presented is not carefully scrutinized. As cognitive response theory suggests, persuasion does not come from the message itself, but from one's cognitive response to the message (Greenwald, 1968). The ELM assumes people are motivated to hold attitudes that accurately reflect the state of the world (Festinger, 1954). When people are motivated and able to process arguments, they are more likely to use the central route. As this motivation and ability decreases, the peripheral route and the importance of peripheral cues increases.

Heuristic-Systematic Model. The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and the ELM are similar models, developed concurrently. Like the ELM, the HSM argues there are two paths to persuasion. Systematic processing, like the central route, is detailed, analytic processing of message content. Heuristic processing, like the peripheral route, is relatively effortless processing—people exert little effort in judging the validity of the message, but rely on cues unrelated to message content to form an attitude or opinion. The ELM and HSM argue that systematic/central and heuristic/peripheral processing can occur simultaneously—the two forms of processing exert additive or independent effects (e.g. Petty, 1994). The HSM is narrower than the ELM in defining the two routes(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).. The peripheral route refers to any cognitive or affective process that affects persuasion besides scrutiny of the argument. In contrast, heuristic processing refers to simple

rules that mediate persuasion, or attitude formation. Heuristic processing is viewed as one type of peripheral processing in the ELM (Petty, 1994). Eagly and Chaiken (1993) also point out that heuristic processes will not be applied in attitude judgments unless salient and accessible.

Like the ELM, the HSM assumes people are motivated to have accurate attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, the HSM allows for other motivations, including impression motivation—the desire to hold socially accepted attitudes (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Impression-relevant motivations are active when social relationships are salient, or when people are expected to explain their attitudes to others (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). Impression motivation can occur under heuristic or systematic processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Impression motivation is particularly relevant to issues that invoke social identity (as with subgroups and superordinate groups) because people are motivated to follow the group and to avoid social sanctions from the group when they deviate. The HSM, like the ELM, leaves the processes through which social pressure influences persuasion dependent on the context in which it occurs.

Attitude Change versus Attitude Formation. Although persuasion research mostly considers attitude change, it can be applied in the context of attitude formation—as is the focus of the current studies. Consumer psychology often applies principles from dual process models of persuasion when evaluating responses to advertisements. Persuasion is measured as liking for a target product or argument, but not change from prior attitudes about a target (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983). Models of attitude formation invoke both effortful, reasoned processes (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) and heuristic-peripheral processes (e.g., Gordon & Holyoak, 1983). Attitudes can be formed based on accessible information (e.g., Wilson, Hodges & LaFleur, 1995) or stored attitudes activated automatically (e.g., Smith, Fazio, & Cejka, 1996). Attitudes are likely activated automatically from memory,

but adjusted based on other accessible information, such as group norms (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The ELM and HSM agree attitudes can be constructions or stored evaluations depending on processing capacity and attitude strength (Wilson et al., 2000). Attitude formation occurs when an attitude is non-existent or weak (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993)—when bandwagoning is also mostly likely to occur (Rothschild & Malhotra, 2014).

Persuasion by the Majority and Minority. Research supports both systematic and heuristic processing accounts of majority influence. Persuasion from conformity pressure is a peripheral cue—people focus on conforming and the argument is assumed to be valid simply because many people agree with it, but not based on the merits of the argument (Asch, 1952; Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The majority position may be heuristically processed because it creates a situation in which people focus on the majority's stated position and pressures to conform to the majority opinion, but not on the content of their arguments (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983).

Alternatively, people may elaborate more on, or systematically process, a position when it is supported by a majority (e.g., Harkins & Petty, 1981), while minority support can lead to heuristic processing. Processing type partially depends on prior attitudes, cognitive resources, and perceived relevance. People may use the information about the majority position to decide whether the message is even worth considering. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) argue when motivation to elaborate is low (e.g., low personal relevance, high distraction) majority information will be used as a peripheral cue; when motivation to elaborate is high, the position of the majority will not influence one's attitude position. When people disagree with a majority opinion, they process messages more systematically (Mackie, 1987). Majority opinions are remembered more, privately accepted, maintained over a long period of time, and generalize to

related issues. Mackie argues a majority consensus alerts people to the possible validity of their arguments or position and directs attention to processing these arguments as a result. Minority positions can also encourage systematic processing because people work to understand an alternative point of view (Moscovici, 1980, 1985; Nemeth, 1995; Nemeth & Kwan, 1985, 1987).

Even when people have sufficient motivation or ability, they may still rely on the majority as a heuristic—but attitude change from heuristics results in shorter term change and less generalization. Majority messages motivate people to process information systematically, while messages from a numerical minority are systematically processed when they are difficult to ignore (De Vries, De Dreu, Gordijn, & Schuurman, 1996). Persuasive arguments from a majority compared to a minority only produced greater attitude change when message recipients had cognitive resources to engage in systematic processing (Schuurman, Siero, De Dreu, & Buunk, 1995). When an issue was self-relevant, messages with minority compared to majority support elicited more general thoughts, but majority compared to minority supported messages elicited more message-specific thoughts (Trost, Maass, & Kenrick, 1992). Majority support motivates systematic versus heuristic processing when the opinion initially differs from that of the decision maker, cognitive resources are available, and the issue is self-relevant.

Persuasion and Groups. There are conflicting accounts of whether social information from groups is systematically/centrally or heuristically/peripherally processed—again processing partially depends on larger context. People were more persuaded by ingroup versus outgroup members when group memberships were salient, but not when group membership was not salient (McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). The impact of group membership on attitudes depends seeing the categorization as self-relevant (McGarty et al., 1994). Important ingroups can provide a central, rather than peripheral, route to persuasion when salient because self-relevance

enhances the central route (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Systematic processing of group arguments occurs more for ingroup members. People were more persuaded by strong, but not weak, ingroup arguments, compared to strong or weak arguments from an outgroup—especially when the issue was relevant (versus irrelevant) to the ingroup (Mackie, Worth, & Asuncion, 1990). People were persuaded by an ingroup member when arguments were strong, but not weak, demonstrating the central message was attended to. People were unmotivated to elaborate when arguments were presented by an outgroup member—relying on heuristic processing instead.

Research on minority influences defines minorities in numerical terms of group membership (e.g., two people in a group of five), but not in terms of underrepresented social identities. Numerical majorities in the minority influence context do not have to be without power or influence in a larger context (i.e., historically oppressed groups). Persuasion based on group identity focuses on messages from ingroup and outgroups. This research has not focused on messages from groups at different levels of abstraction. In the context of current studies, people are given minimal information—simply polls with the number of people that agree or disagree with an issue. People may therefore engage in peripheral/heuristic processing, because they only have group cues (social norms), without strong or weak arguments on which to elaborate. Conversely, participants may engage in central/systematic processing if the message is perceived to come from an ingroup, and the issue is self-relevant. Persuasion and influence from groups is further complicated by perceived conflict within and among groups.

Conflicting Norms

Conflict between the Individual and the Group. The individual does not always follow group norms and may resist social influence. One is more likely to resist group pressure with greater confidence in his or her abilities and opinions—confidence which can decrease over time

if the opinion is not reinforced by the group (Hochbaum, 1954; Noelle-Neumann, 1974).

The normative conflict model (Packer, 2008) argues people will intentionally dissent when they perceive a conflict between the norm and another behavioral standard. Alternative standards can come from personal values, other group memberships, or standards of the group itself. Although self-categorization theory would predict that weak identifiers would conform less than strong identifiers (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Deshpandé et al., 1986), the normative conflict model argues strong identifiers may not conform in order to create positive change (dissent) while weak identifiers may not conform because other identities are more important (disengagement; Packer, 2009; Packer & Chasteen, 2010). Dissent is most likely to occur when group norms are the least important source of information compared to other standards.

Dissent in the context of bandwagoning focuses on support for the underdog; people are more likely to support a minority position when they have high levels of information and strongly committed views (Bartels, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Paterson, 1980) and more likely to follow a likely winner when self-relevance and consequences are high (Kim et al., 2008). Support for an underdog depends on one's sense of fairness or view of social arrangements—underdogs gain support when they exert greater effort, even with less ability (Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). Research has largely applied underdog support to contexts in which the underdog has agency (e.g., a sports team, a nation in conflict), not abstract, passive targets, such as social policies that cannot exert effort. Support for the underdog is largely still the exception to the rule and most studies on underdog effects focus on perceptions of a third party without consequence for the self. Bandwagoning is more likely when the group that approves of the majority is self-relevant.

Outgroup-Ingroup Conflict. Comparisons with outgroups help create positive

distinctiveness (Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Positive distinctiveness occurs when people shift their stereotypes and behaviors to maximize the differences between the ingroup and other groups to make the ingroup appear more positive and valued. When people perceived an outgroup as un-environmental, they perceived the ingroup as more environmental (i.e., caring for the environment, living sustainably). But when an outgroup was environmental, people perceived ingroups as less environmental (Rabinovich, Morton, Postmes, & Verplanken, 2012). Stereotypes about the ingroup relative to outgroups affected participants' individual values and environmental behavioral intentions. The effect of conflict between outgroup and ingroup norms on behavior and attitudes can depend on whether the outgroup provides an upward or a downward social comparison for group standards.

People may not only fail to conform to an outgroup, but will resist influence by an outgroup member. People view outgroup criticism of the ingroup as less legitimate and constructive—they react defensively and derogate the critic (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Oppes, Sevensson, 2002). In contrast, an ingroup member can be viewed more positively when they criticize compared to praise the ingroup, especially when they are viewed as invested in the group (Hornsey et al., 2002; Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthorpe, 2004). Counterintuitively, low group identifiers are influenced by both the ingroup and the outgroup than high group identifiers, who are predominantly influenced by the ingroup (Fielding, Terry, Masser, & Hogg, 2008). High group identifiers may look to the ingroup for information, but are not as attuned to or affected by outgroup information.

In the intergroup context, group norms can provide strategic benefits. Norms coordinate group members to advance group interests. Individual conformity depends on perceived benefits of conforming and costs of dissenting (Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005). Outgroup norms are

less relevant to behavior or attitudes unless the outgroup has power and ability to monitor the ingroup (Reicher & Levine, 1994) or poses a threat requiring ingroup action (Gaertner & Insko, 2000). People are more likely to favor the ingroup when their group has high versus low power.

Low-status groups even show *outgroup* rather than ingroup favoritism in a minimal group paradigm, without past conflict or future consequences (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). People displayed more intergroup bias only when they perceived their group status was illegitimate, regardless of group power (Hornsey, Spears, Cremers, & Hogg, 2003). Intergroup bias was driven by lower ratings of the outgroup rather than higher ratings of the ingroup. People feel more distrust of the outgroup when the power structure is illegitimate. Hornsey and colleagues manipulated power as group representation in a student senate. This manipulation is similar to the current paper's goal to investigate the effects of group representation on adherence to norms. Hornsey and colleagues found no effect of power on outgroup derogation, but this does not address adherence to norms. Group identification in these studies (not at the superordinate group, or group shared by multiple small groups, level) did not depend on perceived group power or legitimacy. People distrust the outgroup more when they perceive unjust representation, but not because they identify with their group more. This has implications for polls—if the ingroup is unfairly represented, people may distrust the poll and information provided by an outgroup in the poll, and be subsequently less likely to bandwagon.

Ingroup-Ingroup Conflict. The majority of research has focused on the influence of ingroup norms or on the conflict between ingroup and outgroup norms—few studies have focused on the conflict between ingroups—two (or more) different group to which one belongs. Ingroup normative conflict can either demotivate or motivate action (McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2013). Conflict signals that a behavior either is ineffective and should be stopped, or

should increase to change the group's behavior. People were energized, or had increased pro-environmental intentions, by conflicting environmental norms between important ingroup (e.g., family, friends, and peers/colleagues) when they had prior positive environmental attitudes and perceived high efficacy of individual action (McDonald, et al., 2013). They saw their behavior as important in making a difference in the environment when groups were inconsistent in environmental support. Perceptions of efficacy partially mediate the effect of norm conflict on pro-environmental behavior (McDonald, Fielding, & Louis, 2014).

To my knowledge, no work has investigated the conflict between differing *abstract levels* of identification (e.g. nested identities). McDonald and colleagues (2013, 2014) investigated conflicts between ingroups (i.e., family, Australians, the community). They investigated the discrepancies in descriptive norms between two groups, controlling for prevailing norms. McDonald and colleagues also calculated the extent to which norms differed, but did not examine the extent to which participants viewed nested identities (e.g., household and community) as overlapping or related. In the current work, I am interested in the extent to which the norms of a larger, superordinate group affect attitudes as a function of subgroup membership. People inhabit multiple overlapping group identifications. I am a student at the University of Kansas (KU) but within this identity I belong to the smaller social category of graduate students. I share my KU identity with faculty and undergraduates, but our subgroup identities (faculty and graduate student) occasionally come into conflict with one another or with our larger KU identity. For example, faculty may differ in perceived importance of athletics compared to the attitude promoted by the larger University.

In politics and polling, there are many potential conflicts among subgroup (e.g., identities nested within a larger, shared group) and superordinate group identities. One challenge of

multicultural societies is integrating multiple cultural groups as one national community (e.g., Citrin & Sears, 2014; Fredrickson, 1999). Pollsters frequently report trends among many overlapping and divergent subgroups (e.g., race, gender, national attitudes, state-level attitudes). Subgroups may see themselves as representative of the superordinate group, but also may perceive themselves as excluded from prototypes of the superordinate group based on subgroup status and power. I now turn to research on subgroup-superordinate group relations to further explore these possibilities and explain why I expect marginalized subgroups will perceive themselves as excluded from the superordinate group and the consequences of this for bandwagoning

Subgroup/Superordinate Group Relations

Ingroup Projection Model. The ingroup projection model (IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) argues superordinate groups provide a basis for comparison between subgroups. Subgroups fit within the superordinate group, but have distinct characteristics, and norms. Groups project ingroup characteristics onto the superordinate group and view the ingroup as prototypical of the superordinate group. The more one identifies with both the superordinate group and the subgroup, the more they view the ingroup as prototypical and increase negative evaluations of other sub-outgroups (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2003). A vague, complex, and inclusive, more abstract representation (e.g., Europeans vs. West Germans) of a superordinate group attenuates ingroup projection—neither group is solely representative of the superordinate group (Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007). Subgroups can agree on the legitimacy of disparities in superordinate group prototypicality, but generally people are biased to see their group as more positively valued by being more prototypical (Wenzel et al., 2007). Ingroup projection does not necessarily mean that subgroups consider themselves absolutely

more prototypical than other sub-outgroups[1], but overestimate the degree of relative prototypicality that the sub-outgroup attributes to them (Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004; Wenzel et al., 2007). It is often the case that one subgroup is more representative of the superordinate group than other subgroups, in part due to group-based power and/or numerical differences in proportion of the superordinate group (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Subgroup Relations. Subgroup membership within a superordinate group can lead to subgroup competition. People categorized only at the superordinate group level, compared to people only categorized at the subgroup level or at both the subgroup and superordinate group level, showed greater subgroup identification and inter-subgroup bias (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Subgroup bias increases under only superordinate categorization potentially because superordinate categorization threatens subgroup identities and subgroup members attempt to restore subgroup boundaries. People categorized exclusively at the superordinate group level tend to dislike similar sub-outgroups more than dissimilar sub-outgroups—potentially in an attempt to increase subgroup optimal distinctiveness and restore subgroup boundaries (Brewer, 1993). However, people simultaneously categorized as a subgroup and superordinate group showed more ingroup bias when the sub-outgroup was different rather than similar (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). Inter-subgroup bias increases when the superordinate group is seen as too inclusive, or subgroups are too similar to create optimal distinctiveness between subgroup (Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 1993; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Overly inclusive superordinate groups may encourage subgroups to emphasize their differences. This occurs even when subgroup boundaries are preserved within the superordinate group, partially depending on group power.

[1] This is the case in many minority/majority contexts when widely shared beliefs about social reality suggest that one group is prototypical. For example, both Black and White Americans view White Americans as more prototypical of Americans than Black Americans.

People in low- versus high-status groups showed a greater desire to be categorized at the superordinate group level and people showed more bias when they were high-status and only superordinate group categorization was salient compared to multiple group salience (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002). When one subgroup has disproportionate control of the superordinate group, sub-outgroup bias increases—likely in an attempt to maintain equal representation (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Subgroup relations depend on group boundaries and relationship with the superordinate group—subgroups are biased against one another, especially when categorized exclusively at the superordinate group level. Bias decreases when people are categorized at the subgroup and superordinate group levels simultaneously, but not when subgroups have unequal control or the superordinate groups is conceptualized too broadly. This research has focused on intergroup bias among subgroups, but not social influence among subgroups and superordinate groups.

Subgroup Asymmetry. Subgroups may differ in adherence to superordinate group norms because of disparities in status and superordinate group identification. According to the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis, high status group members feel greater ownership over the nation than low status group members in two ways—1) high status groups feel greater national identification and 2) high status groups have a greater association between subgroup and superordinate identities than low status groups (Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010; Van Berkel et al., 2016). High status groups feel greater ownership over the nation in part because they have greater access to realistic (e.g., wealth, education) and symbolic resources (e.g., historical narratives, norms; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Social representation of the superordinate (national) group is closely aligned with representation of high status groups (e.g., White Americans, men). White Americans are more easily associated with symbols of America than are Black, Asian, or Latino Americans (Devos &

Banaji, 2005; Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Devos & Ma, 2008). People are more likely to associate men and masculinity than women and femininity with American identity (Van Berkel et al., 2016). Asymmetry in American national identification and perceived identification is not restricted to numeric differences—high-status numerical minorities (e.g., White South Africans) had slightly greater national identification than numerical minorities with less power (Staerklé et al., 2010). Women, who are roughly numerically equivalent with men, report lower national identification and lower correlations between national and gender identification than men and are perceived as less prototypically American than men (Van Berkel et al., 2016). Racial minorities who face discrimination feel a lower sense of belonging in the nation (Dovidio, Gluszek, John, Ditlmann, & Lagunes, 2010; Molina, Phillips, & Sidanius, 2015; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). Low-status subgroup members are seen as less prototypical and report lower identification with the superordinate group with potential downstream consequences for following the behavior and attitudes of the larger group.

Subgroup Membership and Superordinate Norms. High-status subgroup members may follow superordinate group norms more than low-status subgroup members because they are viewed as more prototypical of the superordinate group and have greater control in defining the superordinate group (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997; Terry et al., 1999). When superordinate and subgroup norms conflict, low-status group members may disengage from the superordinate norm to follow a potentially more central, subgroup (e.g., Packer, 2008). Subgroup-superordinate group relationships provide the opportunity for subgroups to be under or overrepresented within a superordinate group. If low-status subgroups see themselves as underrepresented in shaping superordinate norms, they may disengage from the norm or even perceive it as an outgroup norm. Relevance of the issue to subgroups may also influence bandwagoning—relevance

increases systematic processing and discourages use of heuristic cues, including normative information.

The Current Studies

The current studies examined the extent to which superordinate group norms influence people depending on subgroup status. How does subgroup-superordinate group conflict affect behavior and attitudes? Because low-status groups tend to be less represented and less identified with the national, superordinate group I expect:

1) Low-status subgroup members will identify with the national, superordinate group less than will high-status subgroup members,

2) Low-status subgroup members will see themselves as less represented in national polls than will high-status subgroup members,

3) Low-status subgroup members will be less likely to adhere to the norms presented in national polls compared to high-status group members,

4) Norm adherence will depend on perceived representation. Low-status subgroup members will bandwagon less than high-status subgroups members to the extent they see their group as underrepresented and less identified with the superordinate group, and

5) Subgroups will be less likely to follow superordinate group norms when the issue is particularly relevant to subgroup interests because relevance discourages heuristic use.

I tested these ideas in three studies about national policy issues. I chose policy issues rather than political candidates for two reasons: 1) policy issues can be non-partisan and therefore minimize influence by other important group identities and 2) policy issues can be chosen that are less familiar to participants than elections in a main election year and are more susceptible to bandwagon effects. In Studies 1 and 2, participants viewed a national policy poll

and reported perceived racial representation when no racial breakdown for the poll was provided. In Study 3, participants viewed a poll that either stated a majority of participants were men or women. I expect low-status group members will follow superordinate social norms less than high-status group members because they identify with the nation less and adherence to social norms will depend on subgroup representation (See Table 1 for hypotheses and results).

Study 1

I examined the extent to which perceptions of subgroup representation affected responses to polling information. Participants viewed a poll that either indicated a majority of respondents supported the court order requiring Apple to help the FBI in unlocking the San Bernadino shooters' iPhone or opposed the court order. Participants rated support for the court order and perceived racial group representation of the poll.

I expect minority, low-status subgroup members (i.e., Black Americans) will follow the superordinate (i.e., "American") group norms less than majority, high-status subgroup members (i.e., White Americans), because minority subgroup members are viewed and view themselves as less part of the superordinate group compared to majority subgroup members.

Method

Participants

Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 158 participants were needed for a detectable $f = .25$ with $p = .05$. I recruited participants using Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk system (M-turk). White participants were recruited normally through M-turk; because the majority of M-turk workers are White (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), I did not need to specifically recruit White participants. Black participants were recruited using TurkPrime, which uses M-turk, but can restrict participation based on previously recorded demographic

characteristics for a fee. Participants were excluded if they indicated any race/ethnicity other than White or Black. The final sample included 71 White and 76 Black participants (80 men, 67 women, M_{age} = 34.11; See Appendix J). Participants were compensated $0.75.

Procedure

Participants viewed a poll adapted for study purposes from PEW reports (PEW Research Center, 2016). The poll asked about support for Apple or for the Department of Justice (DOJ) in unlocking the iPhone of the shooters in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The issue cuts across party lines—the slight majority of Republicans (56%) and Democrats (55%) favored the Justice Department with Independents evenly divided (42% not unlock; 45% unlock). Participants were told 1,002 American adults answered the question: "In response to a court order tied to ongoing FBI investigation of San Bernardino attacks, Apple should:" Participants were randomly assigned one of two conditions that counterbalanced which opinion represented the majority: the poll showed either a majority (61%) thought Apple *should* unlock the iPhone or a majority thought Apple *should not* unlock the iPhone. The opposing view was a minority (36%) with 3% always saying "Didn't Know." Data were collected while the issue was unresolved (See Appendix A).

Measures

Manipulation check. Participants indicated which policy position was leading the poll by selecting from the options: Should not unlock iPhone, Should unlock iPhone, Don't know. This checked that participants paid attention to and correctly interpreted poll results (See Appendix B for Study 1 Measures).

Policy preference. Participants indicated their opinion on a 6-pt semantic differential scale (*1 = Should not unlock iPhone* to 6 = *Should unlock iPhone; M* = 2.82; *SD* = 1.98). Higher

scores indicated greater bandwagoning when the poll majority thought Apple should cooperate to unlock the iPhone, but lower scores indicated greater bandwagoning when the majority thought Apple should not cooperate to unlock the iPhone.

Policy party favorability. Participants rated the favorability of Apple and the DOJ using a 7-pt Likert scale (*1 = Mostly unfavorable*; *7 = Mostly favorable*; $M_{\text{Apple}} = 4.88$, $SD_{\text{Apple}} = 1.76$, $M_{\text{DOJ}} = 3.79$, $SD_{\text{DOJ}} = 3.79$).

Time of Opinion. Participants indicated when they formed opinions about the policy issue, adapted from the American National Election Survey (ANES), using five categories (*1 = Just now, 2 = In the last 3 days, 3 = In the last week, 4 = In the last month, 5 = Before that*). The majority of participants reported they decided "in the last month" (32%), 23.1% decided "before that", 27.9% "just now", 12.2% "in the last week", and 4.8% "in the last 3 days."

Phone ownership. Because participants' personal phone usage could affect their response to unlocking an iPhone, participants indicated whether they owned an iPhone (34.7%), a smartphone other than an iPhone (54.4%), a non-smartphone cellphone (8.8%), or no cellphone (2%).

Influence of poll. Participants self-reported the extent to which the poll factored into their opinions on a 1 (*Not at all*) to 7 (*Very Much*) scale ($M = 2.48$, $SD = 1.85$).

Prior exposure to information. Participants reported the extent to which they had previously heard information (adapted from the ANES) about the conflict between Apple and the DOJ on a scale from 1 (*A lot*) to 7 (*Nothing at all; M* = 3.34, *SD* = 1.71).

Group representation. Participants indicated whether the poll was a good representation of White and Black Americans using a 7-pt scale (*1 = Not at all representative* to *7 = Extremely representative*).

Group identification.

American identification. Participants indicated agreement with three items designed to measure American identification using a 7-pt Likert scale (*1 = Strongly Disagree*; *7 = Strongly Agree*). The items were: *I am glad to be an American; I think that Americans have a lot to be proud of; The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity.* Items were adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) and Leach et al. (2008; $M = 5.09$; $SD = 1.53$; $\alpha = .91$; See Appendix I).

Racial identification. Participants completed the same group identification measure as American identification, but for race/ethnicity (e.g., "I think that Black Americans have a lot to be proud of"). Participants saw a scale specific to the race/ethnicity indicated in demographics ($M_{White} = 4.71$, $SD_{White} = 1.59$, $\alpha_{White} = .89$; $M_{Black} = 6.00$, $SD_{Black} = 1.17$, $\alpha_{Black} = .80$; See Appendix I).

Results

Manipulation Check

Fifteen participants indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation check, raising the possibility they did not attend to the poll information. These participants were excluded from further analysis.

Identification

A 2 (Race: Black, White) ×2 (Condition: Unlock, Not Unlock) ANOVA indicated no significant interaction or main effect of race or condition on American identification, Fs < 2.75, all ps > .10. Contrary to expectations, participants did not significantly differ in American identification by race or condition (See Table 2 for means and standard deviations of dependent variables; See Tables 3 and 4 for correlations).

A 2 (Race) ×2 (Condition) ANOVA indicated a marginally significant interaction between race and condition on racial identification, $F(1, 128) = 3.39$, $p = .068$ (see Table 5 for effect sizes). Black participants had significantly higher racial identification than White participants in both conditions, ps $< .025$.[2] Black Americans had higher racial identification than White Americans and identification was not affected by poll condition.

Perceived Race Representation

I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine whether participants viewed racial groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of target race on perceived representation, $F(1, 128) = 40.06$, $p < .001$, $f = .56$ (See Figure 1). Participants saw White Americans as more represented in the poll ($M = 5.13$, $SD = 1.43$) than Black Americans ($M = 4.29$, $SD = 1.53$). No other interactions were significant, ps $> .55$. All participants saw comparative under-representation of Black Americans in the poll.

I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their racial/ethnic group as represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial group that matched participants' own racial group (e.g., White Americans' perceived representation of White Americans; Black Americans' perceived representation of Black Americans). There was a significant main effect of race, $F(1, 128) = 6.78$, $p = .010$, $f = .23$. White Americans ($M = 5.08$, $SD = 1.38$) perceived their race as significantly more represented than did Black Americans ($M = 4.41$, $SD = 1.60$). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps $> .70$. White Americans perceived themselves as more represented than did Black

[2] Black participants had slightly higher racial identification when unlocking the iPhone was the minority opinion than when it was the majority opinion, simple effects $F(1, 128) = 2.95$, $p = .089$, $d = .50$. White participants did not differ in racial identity between when unlocking the iPhone was the majority opinion and when it was the minority opinion, simple effects $F(1, 128) = .821$, $p = .367$, $d = .20$.

Americans and this was unaffected by the poll information.

Bandwagoning by Race

I conducted a 2 (Race: Black, White) × 2 (Poll condition: Majority Unlock, Majority Not Unlock) ANOVA to examine the effects of poll by race. There was a significant interaction between race and condition, $F(1, 128) = 6.04$, $p = .015$ (See Figure 2). Black participants were significantly more likely to support unlocking the iPhone when that was the majority versus minority opinion, simple effects, $F(1, 128) = 14.46$, $p < .001$. White participants' support for unlocking the iPhone did not differ by poll condition, $p = .816$. Counter to expectations, Black Americans bandwagoned, or followed the majority opinion presented in the poll, more than White Americans.

Black participants supported unlocking the iPhone more than White participants when the majority supported unlocking the iPhone, $F(1, 128) = 9.06$, $p = .003$. But not when the minority supported unlocking the iPhone, $p = .641$. Black and White participants were either not influenced by the poll when the majority did not support unlocking the iPhone, or were influenced in the same way. When the majority supported unlocking the iPhone, Black participants were influenced by the polling information more than White participants.

A 2×2 ANOVA indicated patterns in personal opinions about unlocking the iPhone did not extend to opinions about the parties involved. Black participants had a more favorable opinion of Apple ($M = 5.14$, $SD = 1.75$) than White participants ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.79$); $F(1, 128) = 3.85$, $p = .052$, $f = .17$. There was not a significant main effect of condition, or interaction between race and condition on opinion of Apple, ps > .10. Contrary to expectations, participants' opinion of Apple differed by race, but was not affected by poll condition.

A 2×2 ANOVA indicated Black participants had a more favorable opinion of the DOJ (*M*

= 4.07, *SD* = 1.65) than White participants (*M* = 3.41, *SD* = 1.72), *F*(1, 128) = 5.19, *p* = .024, *f* = .20. There was not a significant main effect of condition on opinions of the DOJ or interaction between race and condition on opinions of the DOJ, *p*s > .14. Contrary to expectations, participants' opinion of the DOJ differed by race, but was not affected by poll condition. Bandwagon effects did not generalize to opinions about parties involved.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning score by standardizing participants' opinions unlocking the iPhone within condition and reverse scored participants' support for unlocking the iPhone in the condition in which unlocking the iPhone was the minority opinion—higher scores indicated greater bandwagoning. I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 1.

There was a significant interaction between race and perceived representation, β = .22, *SE* = .12, *p* = .06, 95% CI [-.01, .45]. Black Americans bandwagoned more the more they saw their racial group as represented, β = .22, *SE* = .07, *p* = .002, 95% CI [.08, .37]. White Americans' bandwagoning did not depend on perceived racial representation, β = .00, *SE* = .09, *p* = .970, 95% CI [-.18, .18]. The extent to which Black Americans bandwagoned depended on viewing their racial subgroup as represented within a poll of Americans. White Americans opinions did not depend on viewing their group as represented.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. Racial effects on bandwagoning were not moderated by racial identification *p*s > .09.

Other Variables of Interest

There were no significant main effects, or interactions on prior knowledge of the Apple-DOJ case, all *p*s > .245. Participants did not differ by race or by condition in perceived

familiarity with the issue.

There was a significant interaction between race and condition in the perceived relevance of the poll information to forming opinions, $F(1, 128) = 5.73$, $p = .018$. Black participants indicated being influenced by the poll more than White participants when the majority supported unlocking the iPhone, simple effects, $F(1, 128) = 9.43$, $p = .003$, but not when the majority did not support unlocking the iPhone, simple effects $p = .751$. Black participants reported being significantly more influenced when the majority versus minority supported unlocking the iPhone, simple effects $F(1, 128) = 3.96$, $p = .049$. White participants did not differ between conditions, simple effects $p = .161$. Participants accurately perceived their influence—Black Americans reported greater influence from the poll in the condition in which they followed the poll opinion more and more than White Americans.

Black and White participants did not significantly differ in the timing of opinion, $\chi^2(4) = 6.61$, $p = .158$. Black and White participants did not decide their opinion on unlocking the iPhone any earlier or later than one another. There were no significant differences by race in type of phone ownership, $\chi^2(3) = 1.54$, $p = .673$. Black and White participants were equally likely to own an iPhone, smartphone, or cellphone. This suggests racial differences in bandwagoning cannot be explained by relevance of the issue to participants' self-interest from type of phone ownership or from time of decision.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 provided mixed support for hypotheses. Contrary to expectations, Black Americans followed superordinate group norms *more* than White Americans. But in support of hypothesis 2, Black Americans were more likely to bandwagon when they viewed their racial subgroup as represented. White Americans were not affected by perceived representation of

White Americans. Black Americans may have been more likely to bandwagon with the superordinate (and arguably seen as synonymous with White) norm for strategic reasons. Following the norm of an outgroup, or less similar group can reduce symbolic threat, make a shared identity salient, or signal a willingness to cooperate and engage in reciprocity (e.g., Louis et al., 2005). However, unlike Louis and colleagues, *identification with the sub-ingroup* predicted greater support for superordinate group norms in the current study, but only for Black Americans, the less represented group. White Americans' susceptibility to polling information may not have depended on perceived representation because White Americans are seen as prototypical Americans more than racial minorities (Devos & Banaji, 2005). White Americans perceived higher racial representation within the poll than Black Americans overall. White Americans may assume a high level of representation and be less influenced by minor fluctuations in this representation.

Racial group differences in bandwagoning could not be explained by iPhone ownership, timing of decision, attitudes toward Apple or the DOJ, prior knowledge, or American identification. One might have expected Black Americans to be less trusting of the American government than White Americans, given the history of racial oppression in the U.S., but this history of oppression did not appear to influence attitudes towards the issue of unlocking iPhones or the DOJ, a government agency.

Black participants self-reported greater influence from the poll than White Americans, reflecting racial differences in following the norm of the poll. Poll influence is not necessarily an unconscious process—people shifted attitudes in line with the poll and were aware of poll influence. This conscious influence did not produce reactance (Brehm, 1966)—while White Americans did not bandwagon, they also did not explicitly reject the poll information or show

influence in the opposite direction of the poll. This suggests participants may not have felt their freedom of choice was restricted by the presentation of the poll.

One might suspect that the issue of terrorism and security issues would prompt participants to support security measures that infringe on the rights of others—and that this may be especially true of White Americans who are more threatened by a growing proportion of racial minorities (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2011). This alternative account is not supported by results—White Americans showed relatively low levels of support for unlocking the iPhone, even when that was the majority opinion. This suggests that the absence of bandwagoning effects for White Americans cannot be explained by ceiling effect preferences for heightened intrusive security measures when terrorism is salient. In Study 2, I move to test bandwagoning on issues that are less related to security and intergroup threat.

Study 2

Study 1 results partially supported hypotheses—Black Americans, as a minority subgroup, were more influenced by poll information to the extent they saw their subgroup as represented within the superordinate group. But Black Americans followed superordinate group norms more than the national majority subgroup—White Americans, counter to expectations. It is possible differences in bandwagoning by race for Study 1 were specific to the issue of unlocking the iPhone. While there were no differences in cellphone ownership by race reported in Study 1, Black Americans are less likely to own iPhones (but not smartphones) than are White Americans (PEW Research Center, 2013)—iPhone issues may have therefore been more relevant to White compared to Black Americans. In Study 2A and Study 2B, I changed poll domains and expanded the participant sample to include Asian and Latino/a Americans. In Study 2, I tested whether bandwagoning differences by race and perceived racial representation found in Study 1

would replicate using new polling domains and whether differences in following superordinate social norms would appear for multiple majority and minority subgroup comparisons. As in Study 1, I expected members of minority subgroups would bandwagon less than majority subgroup members and bandwagoning would depend on the perceived representation of the subgroup.

Participants

For Study 2A and 2B, the same participants viewed two different polls about policy issues and reported opinions about each. This allowed me to conduct two follow-up studies using the same sample of participants.

Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 244 participants were needed for a detectable $f = .20$ with $p = .05$. Participants were recruited using the M-turk system. I created four separate surveys to recruit, White, Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans. Participants were directed to take the study only if they identified as the racial/ethnic category advertised. Participants identified their race/ethnicity at the beginning and end of the survey. At the end of the survey, I asked participants to be honest about their race/ethnicity, reminding them they would still be paid, but their honesty would improve the accuracy of data. Participants were excluded (n = 29) if they answered more than one survey (e.g., responded as both a White and a Black participant), changed racial/ethnic identification between the beginning and end of the survey, or identified as a race other than White, Black, Asian, or Latino/a.

Of the 263 remaining participants (160 men, 103 women), 64 were White Americans, 70 Black Americans, 63 Latino/a Americans, and 66 Asian Americans ($M_{age} = 32.48$, $SD_{age} = 9.70$). Participants were compensated $1.

Method—Study 2A and 2B

Procedure

Study 2A. Participants viewed a poll ostensibly released by Gallup adapted for study purposes (Gallup, 2016). The poll asked about support for increasing the age at which people are eligible to receive full social security (SS) benefits. This issue was chosen because it is relatively non-partisan; both liberal and conservative people mostly support maintaining current benefits (PEW Research Center, 2014). Participants were told 1,002 American adults answered the question: "Assuming there would be no change in Social Security benefits for those who are now age 55 or older, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to increase the age at which people are eligible to receive full benefits?" Participants were randomly assigned to see either a majority (63%) thought the age should be increased or should not be increased. The opposing view was a minority (34%) with 3% always saying "Didn't Know" (See Appendix C).

Study 2B. After completing measures for Study 2A, participants viewed a second poll ostensibly released by the PEW Research Center (but actually from Gallup, 2015). The poll asked about support for free trade between the U.S. and other North American countries. This issue was chosen because it is relatively non-partisan—Democrats (63%), Independents (63%), and Republicans (50%) tend to view trade as an opportunity (McCarthy, 2016). Participants were told 2,001 American adults answered the question: "In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America are a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?" Participants were randomly assigned to see either a majority (72%) thought that free trade was a good thing for the U.S. or a bad thing. The opposing view was a minority (25%) with 3% always saying "Didn't Know" (See Appendix E).

Measures

Participants completed the same measures as in Study 1. In both studies, participants

were asked about what the majority supported, their opinion on the issue (1 = Increase the eligibility age for full SS benefits/Free Trade is a good thing; 6 = Do not increase the eligibility age for full SS benefits/Free Trade is a bad thing), the time of their decision, support for the SS system/free trade in general, prior knowledge, the relevance of the poll to decisions, perceived representation of different racial/ethnic groups in the poll, national and racial identification.

In addition to questions from Study 1, participants were asked about willingness to share their opinions with others on a 1-7 Likert-type scale (*1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree*; $M = 5.20$; $SD = 1.60$). Participants completed a three-item measure of feelings of being an outsider in the United States (Dovidio and colleagues, 2010). Participants indicated agreement with statements (e.g., "I feel like an outsider to the United States) on a scale from 1 (*Strongly Disagree*) to 7 (*Strongly Agree*; $M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.35$; $\alpha = .66$; See Appendices D and F).

Study 2A Results

Manipulation Check

Thirty-four participants (12.9%) indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation check and were excluded from further analysis, leaving 229 participants.

Identification

American Identification. A 2 (Condition) × 4 (Race) ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between race and condition on American identification, $F(3, 215) = 2.69$, $p = .047$ (See Table 6 for means and standard deviations; See Tables 7 and 8 for correlations; See Table 9 for effect sizes). Latino/a Americans had higher national identification when support for increasing the SS age was the minority versus the majority opinion, $F(1, 215) = 7.29$, $p = .007$. There were no significant differences between conditions for White, Black, and Asian participants, $ps > .55$.

There were marginally significant differences by race when support for increasing the SS age was the minority, $F(3, 215) = 2.57$, $p = .055$; Latino/a Americans had significantly higher national identification than White, $p = .008$, and Black Americans, $p = .052$. There were no other significant differences between participants, ps > .16. There were no significant differences by race when support for increasing the SS age was the majority, $p = .231$. Contrary to hypotheses, White Americans did not have higher national identification compared to Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans. Poll condition largely did not influence national identification—Latino/a Americans had higher national identification when the poll majority did not support increasing the SS age compared to White and Black Americans, but no other differences were significant.

Racial Identification. A 2×4 ANOVA indicated a significant interaction between race and condition on racial identification, $F(1, 215) = 3.67$, $p = .013$ (See Figure 3). Latino/a Americans had higher racial identification when support for increasing the SS age was the minority versus majority opinion, $F(1, 215) = 8.51$, $p = .004$. There were no significant differences between conditions for White, Black, and Asian participants, ps > .21.

There were significant differences by race when the majority supported increasing the SS age, simple effects $F(3, 215) = 5.04$, $p = .002$, $f = .27$. Black Americans had significantly higher racial identification than White, $p = .001$, and Latino/a Americans, $p = .024$, but not Asian Americans, $p = .654$. Asian Americans had significantly higher racial identification than White, $p = .003$, and Latino/a Americans, $p = .059$. There were no other significant differences by race when the majority supported increasing the SS age, ps > .26.

There were significant differences by race when the minority supported increasing the SS age, simple effects $F(3, 215) = 6.93$, $p < .001$, $f = .31$. White Americans had lower racial identification than Black $p = .002$, Latino/a, $p < .001$, and Asian Americans, $p = .022$. Latino/a

American had significantly higher racial identification than Asian Americans, $p = .023$. There were no other significant differences by race, ps > .13.

In partial support of expectations, White Americans had lower racial identification than Black and Asians Americans in both conditions, and lower racial identification than Latino/a Americans when the majority did not support increasing the SS age. I did not have any specific a priori predictions about differences within racial minority subgroups, but there were significant differences within conditions. When the majority supported increasing the SS age, both Black and Asian Americans had higher racial identification than Latino/a Americans, but when the majority did not support increasing the SS age, Latino/a Americans had higher racial identification than Asian Americans; there were no other significant differences among racial minority subgroups.

Perceived Race Representation

I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed racial groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences in perceived racial representation, *Wilks'* $\lambda = .67$, $F(3, 217) = 34.98$, $p < .001$, $f = .70$ (See Figure 4). White Americans were seen as more represented than Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans, ps < .001. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Latino/a and Asian Americans, ps < .001. There were no significant differences between Latino/a and Asian Americans, $p = .314$. As expected, White Americans were seen as the most represented racial group in a sample of Americans. I did not have any specific a priori predictions about differences within racial minority subgroups. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Asian and Latino/a Americans, even though Black Americans are a numerical minority compared to Latino/a

Americans in the US population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).

There was no significant interaction between participant race and perceived racial representation or three-way interaction between participant race, condition, and perceived representation, *p*s > .09. All participants viewed White Americans as the most represented group, followed by Black Americans, and then equally Asian and Latino/a Americans

I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their race as represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial group that matched participants' racial group. There was no interaction between race and condition, $p = .298$ (See Figure 5). There was a main effect of condition, $F(1, 219) = 11.81$, $p = .001$, $f = .23$. People saw their group as more represented when SS eligibility age increases are the minority ($M = 4.73$, $SD = 1.70$) versus majority opinion ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 1.65$). There was a significant main effect of race, $F(3, 219) = 3.68$, $p = .013$, $f = .22$. White Americans saw themselves as significantly more represented in the poll ($M = 4.98$, $SD = 1.48$) than Black ($M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.87$), $p = .037$, Asian ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.56$), $p = .001$, and Latino/a Americans ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 1.81$), $p = .025$. There were no significant differences in perceived representation among Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans, *p*s > .240. As expected, high-status, majority group members (White Americans) saw their group as more represented than did low-status, minority group members (Black, Latino/a, and Asian Americans). Unexpectedly, people saw their race, across racial subgroups, as more represented when the poll majority did not support increasing the SS age compared to when the poll majority supported increasing the SS age.

Bandwagoning by Race

I conducted a 4 (Race) × 2 (Poll condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by race. There was a marginally significant interaction between Race and Condition, $F(3, 219) = 2.36$, *p*

= .072 (See Figure 6). Asian, Latino/a, and White Americans were significantly more likely to support increasing the eligibility age for SS when it was the majority versus minority opinion, simple effects Asian Americans: $F(1, 219) = 19.05$, $p < .001$; Latino/a Americans: $F(1, 219) = 4.89$, $p = .028$; White Americans: $F(1, 219) = 4.12$, $p = .044$. Black Americans did not differ in support for increasing the SS age by condition, simple effects $p = .573$. Contrary to expectations, White Americans were equally likely to bandwagon as Latino/a and Asian Americans. In contrast to expectations and the results of Study 1, Black Americans opinions were not influenced by poll information.

When the majority supported increasing the SS age, White Americans did not differ in support compared to Black, Asian, or Latino/a Americans, simple effects *p*s > .10. Asian Americans supported increasing the SS age significantly less than Black, $p = .002$, and Latino/a Americans, $p = .010$. Black Americans did not differ in support for increasing the SS age compared to Latino/a Americans, $p = .497$. When the majority did not support increasing the SS age, there were no significant differences in policy support by race, *p*s > .12. Asian Americans supported increasing the SS age less than Black and Latino/a Americans when increasing the SS age was the majority opinion, but there were no other significant differences by race. The poll influenced the magnitude of opinion change differently within racial subgroups, but opinions of increasing the SS age were largely not different by racial subgroup within condition.

A 4×2 ANOVA indicated opinions of the SS system were not affected by race or condition—there were no significant main effects or interaction *p*s > .25. The effect of poll condition by race on increasing the SS age did not extend to opinions about the SS system.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning score by standardizing participants' opinions on whether the age of SS benefits should be

increased within condition and then reverse scoring participants' support when increasing the SS age was the majority opinion—higher scores indicated greater bandwagoning. I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 1. There was no interaction between race and perceived representation, β = -.02, *SE* = .04, *p* = .579, 95% CI [-.09, .05]. There was no main effect of race, β = .23, *SE* = .18, *p* = .186, 95% CI [-.11, .58], or perceived representation, β = .18, *SE* = .10, *p* = .075, 95% CI [-.02, .38]. Perceived representation of one's race did not affect tendency to bandwagon.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. Racial identification significantly moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning, β = .09, *SE* = .04, *p* = .039, *95% CI* [.00, .17]. I probed the interaction using Preacher's probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). For Latino/a and Asian Americans, racial identification significantly moderated bandwagoning, Latino/a Americans: simple slope β = .15, *SE* = .06, *p* = .010; Asian Americans: simple slope β = .24, *SE* = .09, *p* = .007. Latino/a and Asian Americans bandwagoned more, the more they identified with their race. The moderation was not significant for White or Black Americans, *p*s > .19.

American identification did not significantly moderate the effect of race on bandwagoning, *p* = .457.

Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue

There was a significant interaction between race and condition on participants' prior knowledge of raising the SS age, $F(3, 219) = 3.17$, $p = .025$. Asian Americans indicated more prior knowledge when the minority versus majority supported increasing the SS age, simple effects $F(1, 219) = 6.64$, $p = .011$. Latino/a Americans indicated less prior knowledge when the minority versus majority supported increasing the SS age, simple effects $F(1, 219) = 3.17$, p =

.074. There was no significant difference between conditions for White and Black Americans, *p*s > .65. Contrary to expectations, participants partially differed by condition in perceived prior knowledge. When the poll majority did not support increasing the SS age, Asian Americans indicated greater prior knowledge and Latino/a Americans indicated less prior knowledge, while poll condition did not affect Black or White Americans.

When the majority did not support increasing the SS age, there were significant differences among participants by race, $F(3, 219) = 5.41$, $p = .001$, $f = .27$. Asian Americans indicated significantly more prior knowledge than White, Black, or Latino/a Americans, *p*s < .005. There were no other significant differences by participant race, *p*s > .48. When the majority supported increasing the SS age, there were no significant differences among participants by race in prior knowledge, $p = .385$. When the majority did not support increasing the SS age, Asian Americans indicated greater prior knowledge compared to all other racial groups. There were no differences by race when the majority supported increasing the SS age.

There was no significant interaction or main effects of race and condition in the perceived relevance of the poll information to forming opinions, *p*s > .09, in feelings of being an outsider, *p*s > .23, or in self-reported willingness to share opinions with others, *p*s > .43. Timing of opinion did not depend on participant race, $\chi^2(12) = 14.49$, $p = .271$. This suggests differences in bandwagoning cannot be explained by perceived influence, feelings of being an outsider, willingness to make opinions public, or timing of decision.

Study 2B Results

Manipulation Check

Thirty-four participants (12.9%) indicated the incorrect answer on the manipulation check and were excluded from further analysis, leaving 229 participants.

Identification

American Identification. There were no significant main effects or interactions of condition and race on American identification, *p*s > .18 (See Table 10 for means and standard deviations; See Tables 11 and 12 for correlations; See Table 13 for effect sizes). Contrary to expectations, participants did not differ in American identification by race.

Racial Identification. There was a significant main effect of race, $F(3, 220) = 8.12$, $p < .001$, $f = .33$; White Americans had significantly lower racial identification ($M = 4.92$, $SD = 1.68$) than Black ($M = 5.99$, $SD = 1.36$, $p < .001$, $d = .70$), Latino/a ($M = 6.01$, $SD = 1.26$, $p < .001$, $d = .73$), and Asian Americans ($M = 5.90$, $SD = 1.18$, $p < .001$, $d = .68$). There were no other significant differences by race, *p*s > .67. White Americans, as a majority group, had lower racial identification than Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans. There was no interaction between race and condition on racial identification or main effect of condition, *p*s > .525.

Perceived Representation

I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed racial groups as represented in the poll with race and condition as between-subjects factors and perceived group representation as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences in perceived racial representation, *Wilks'* $\lambda = .68$, $F(3, 219) = 34.12$, $p < .001$, $f = .68$ (See Figure 7). White Americans were seen as more represented ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.44$) than Black ($M = 4.40$, $SD = 1.61$), Latino/a ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.69$), and Asian Americans ($M = 4.22$, $SD = 1.74$), *p*s < .001. Black Americans were seen as more represented than Latino/a, $p = .018$, and Asian Americans, $p = .035$. There were no significant differences between perceived representation of Latino/a and Asian Americans, $p = .985$. As expected White Americans, as a majority group, were perceived as more represented than Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans, minority groups.

There was no significant interaction between participant race and perceived racial representation or three-way interaction between participant race, condition, and perceived representation, *p*s > .50. Participants' perceived representation differed by target race, but not participant race or by condition.

I calculated a new variable to assess the extent to which participants saw their race as represented. This variable was the perceived representation of the racial group that matched participants' own racial group. There was a significant effect of race, $F(3, 221) = 4.20$, $p = .006$, $f = .24$ (See Figure 8). White Americans saw themselves as more represented in the poll ($M = 5.06$, $SD = 1.35$) than Black ($M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.71$), $p = .005$, Asian ($M = 4.01$, $SD = 1.70$), $p = .001$ and Latino/a Americans ($M = 4.49$, $SD = 1.89$), $p = .076$. There were no significant differences in perceived representation among Black, Asian, and Latino/a Americans, *p*s > .130. There was not a significant interaction between race and condition or main effect of condition, *p*s > .70. In support of hypotheses, White Americans viewed themselves as more represented than did Black, Asian, or Latino/a Americans.

Bandwagoning by Race

I conducted a 4 (Race: White, Black, Latino/a, Asian) × 2 (Poll condition: Trade is Good, Trade is Bad) ANOVA to examine poll effects by race. There was no interaction between Race and Condition, $p = .322$ (See Figure 9).

There was a main effect of condition $F(1, 221) = 32.24$, $p < .001$, $f = .38$; participants viewed trade as better when the majority indicated trade was good ($M = 2.52$, $SD = 1.50$) than when the majority viewed trade negatively ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.72$). As hypothesized, participants bandwagoned—they were more likely to view trade negatively when that was the majority position and more likely to view trade positively when that was the majority position.

There was a main effect of race, $F(3, 221) = 3.28$, $p = .022$, $f = .15$. White Americans viewed trade more negatively ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.62$) than did Latino/a ($M = 3.03$, $SD = 1.76$), $p = .067$, $d = .55$, and Asian Americans ($M = 2.65$, $SD = 1.62$), $p = .002$, $d = .57$, but not Black Americans ($M = 3.22$, $SD = 1.76$), $p = .215$. Black Americans viewed trade more negatively than did Asian, $p = .061$, $d = .33$, but not Latino/a Americans, $p = .543$. Latino/a and Asian Americans did not significantly differ, $p = .201$. Overall, White Americans viewed free trade most negatively while Asian Americans viewed free trade most positively.

Though the interaction between race and condition was not significant, simple effects comparisons revealed a trend that White, Black, and Latino/a Americans' views of trade differed between conditions in line with poll majorities, ps $< .008$. Asian Americans, however, did not differ between conditions, $p = .187$. This suggests Asian Americans bandwagoned less than White, Latino/a, and Black Americans; although, again, this trend was not significant.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I created a bandwagoning score by standardizing participants' opinions on support for free trade within condition and reverse scoring participants' support in the condition when most of the poll supported free trade—higher scores indicated more bandwagoning. I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of race on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 1. There was no interaction between race and perceived representation, or main effect of race or perceived representation, ps $> .325$. Perceived representation of one's race did not affect tendency to bandwagon, or follow superordinate group norms.

Bandwagoning Moderating by Identification. Racial and American identification did not moderate the effect of race on bandwagoning, ps $> .36$.

Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue

There was no significant interaction or main effects of race and condition in the perceived relevance of the poll information to forming opinions, *p*s > .38, in prior knowledge of free trade agreements, *p*s > .09, in feelings of being an outsider, *p*s > .40, or willingness to share opinions with others, *p*s > .56. Timing of opinion did not depend on participant race, $\chi^2(12) = 7.55$, $p = .819$. Though participants differed in opinion of free trade by condition, they perceived themselves equally influenced by the poll direction, perceived similar levels of prior knowledge, and did not differ in timing of opinions.

Study 2 Discussion

Contrary to expectations, racial minority subgroup members did not follow superordinate group norms less than majority subgroup members. In Study 2A, White, Asian, and Latino/a Americans bandwagoned, or adhered to superordinate group norms—Black Americans did *not* bandwagon, in direct conflict with results of Study 1. Bandwagoning did not depend on perceiving one's race as represented for any racial subgroup. In Study 2B, all participants bandwagoned regardless of race. Asian Americans bandwagoned less than other racial subgroups, though this trend was not significant. Bandwagoning did not depend on perceiving one's race as represented for any racial subgroup in Study 2B either.

In Study 2A, Latino/a and Asian Americans bandwagoned more, the more they identified with their racial group. This suggests that racial identification may influence tendency to bandwagon, as in Study 1. This does not explain, however, why White Americans bandwagoned independent of racial identification and Black Americans did not bandwagon independent of racial identification. Racial identification did not moderate bandwagoning for any racial subgroup in Study 2B.

Differences in bandwagoning could not be explained by timing of decision, attitudes,

prior knowledge, American identification, perceived status as an outsider, or willingness to share opinions with others.

In Study 2A, Black Americans differed from other racial groups in adherence to superordinate groups. In Study 2B, Asian Americans differed from other racial groups in adherence to superordinate groups though this trend was not significant. Why did some minority subgroup members bandwagon while others did not—especially if perceived representation cannot explain differences? It is possible subgroup bandwagoning depends on the extent to which the issue is *relevant* to the subgroup. Self-relevance can lead to greater central processing and less reliance on polls as a heuristic cue (e.g., McGarty et al., 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, for no racial group did opinions about the poll issue generalize to attitudes about the parties involved in the issue, which suggests that people did not internalize the attitude change, but merely conformed to the group opinion (e.g., Mackie, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Self-relevance by group membership can change how poll messages are processed and may explain subgroup differences in bandwagoning.

Black Americans may not have been as influenced by superordinate group norms about social security in Study 2A because social security is more relevant to Black Americans than other racial groups. The Social Security Administration is race-neutral in assigning benefits, but the unique challenges facing individual ethnic groups (Black, Native, Asian, and Hispanic Americans) are presented on their website (www.ssa.gov/people). Social security is more important for Black Americans as a source of income over age 65 compared to White beneficiaries (Hendley & Bilimoria, 1999). Black children are more reliant on Social Security benefits compared to White children because of higher rates of disability and death before retirement age for Black Americans (Leigh & Wheatley, 2010). Black Americans support

extending coverage of social security and opposed reducing benefits more than White and Hispanic Americans (PEW Research Center, 2014). However, Latino/a Americans are also more dependent on social security than White or Asian Americans (Fry, Kochhar, Passel, & Suro, 2005) and Black and Latino/a Americans receive greater benefits relative to tax rates compared to White Americans (Government Accountability Office, 2003). Latino/a Americans did not show a similar resilience against influence, which suggests group differences in bandwagoning may not be due to relevance alone. Latino/a, Black, and White Americans did not differ in reported prior exposure to the issue—Asian Americans reported greater knowledge than other racial groups, but were not less likely to bandwagon.

Similarly, Study 2B asked about free trade in North America, but the trade deal most widely discussed at the time of data collection was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP includes trade deals with many countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, Mexico, and Chile), but the trade deal is largely discussed with countries in the Asia-Pacific, and is part of President Obama's "pivot to Asia" strategy (e.g., Collinson, 2015; Perlez, 2015). This strategy aims to expand and intensify the role of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region—free trade negotiations with South Korea opened the U.S. into TPP negotiations (Manyin et al., 2012). Recent rhetoric focuses on losing economic opportunities to foreign countries, especially China and India (McCormick & Dopp, 2016). Presumptive Republican Presidential nominee Donald Trump has made trade reform with China (namely "reclaiming" jobs from Chinese manufacturers) a policy cornerstone, but does not focus on North American free trade (www.donaldtrump.com). People rated Canada, Japan, EU countries, India, Brazil and Mexico as mostly favorable countries to trade with (over 50% saw it as good for the U.S.), but rated South Korea and China as the least favorable countries with which to trade (PEW Research Center, 2010). Neither Bloomberg nor

PEW Research Polls describe views on trade by participant race, so it is unknown how different racial groups perceive U.S. free trade deals. Free trade might be perceived as mostly involving Asian countries and may have been seen as of more relevance to Asian Americans. The manipulation specified North American free trade, but I did not check to which countries participants thought the free trade issue pertained. I did not manipulate or assess perceived relevance of the issue to race.

Relevance could have influenced participant responses in Study 2A and 2B through heuristic cues. When an issue is relevant to a subgroup's group interest, they may engage in systematic processing more and use cues, like group norms, less (Mackie, 1987). In Study 3, I manipulate issue relevance by gender and assess perceived issue relevance in relation to bandwagoning. If perceived relevance of the issue to the subgroup affects adherence to superordinate group norms, then this would suggest subgroups do not differ in following superordinate group norms based on power, representation, or even identification, but rather based on how the issue affects subgroups differentially. If relevance affects adherence to superordinate group norms, then this would help explain why high-status subgroups did not bandwagon in Study 1, but some low-status subgroups did not bandwagon in Study 2 (and did so inconsistently). Subgroup differences in bandwagoning may not lie within group characteristics and inter/intragroup relations, but rather in issue characteristics as related to the subgroup.

Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 examined whether subgroups followed superordinate group norms depending on *perceived* group representation with mixed results—in Study 1 Black participants' adherence to superordinate group norms depended on perceived group representation; a similar pattern did not emerge in Study 2. In Study 3, I expanded the subgroup domain to gender versus

racial/ethnic groups. Women and men are approximately numerically equivalent, but women are also underrepresented in control of the national, superordinate group (e.g., Van Berkel et al., 2016). I explicitly manipulated subgroup numerical representation within the superordinate group and relevance of the poll issue (Issue 1 and Issue 2) to subgroup interests. In gender, like race, subgroups have unequal power within the superordinate group, but gender numerical proportions can be manipulated with greater realism than racial proportions—participants are unlikely to believe that Black Americans are a majority in a national poll. I expected participants to follow superordinate group norms the least when they were underrepresented and the issue was relevant to subgroup interests.

Method

Participants

Based on a priori power analysis with 80% power, at least 210 participants were needed for a detectable $f = .25$ with $p = .05$. The first group of 129 KU students (74 men, 55 women) participated for partial course credit. The majority of participants were White (77.5%); with 7.8% Multi-racial, 6.2% Latino/a, 4.7% Black, and 3.9% Asian. This represented all participants we could collect in a semester, despite a long collection period. To augment the sample, I added 82 participants (49 men, 33 women) from M-turk. The majority of participants were White (75.6%); with 11% Latino/a, 6.1% Asian, 4.9% Black, and 2.4% Multi-racial. Participant type was included in all analyses as a covariate.

Procedure

Participants viewed two polls. Participants viewed a poll (Issue 1) ostensibly released by Gallup (but from PEW Research Center, 2016) about a relatively banal issue—support for a grocery discount card that tracks shopping habits and sells data to third parties. Participants saw

that either men or women were a majority of the poll (majority condition: 68% vs. 32%) and that majority either supported or opposed these discount cards (poll condition: 72% vs. 25%, with 3% undecided; See Appendix G). Participants reported attitudes before viewing a second poll.

The second poll (Issue 2) ostensibly used the same sample as the first, but was about a gender-relevant issue—equal pay laws. The poll, adapted from Huffington Post/YouGov (Swanson, 2014), indicated a majority either thought current laws were about right or the government should enact more equal pay laws (69% to 28% with 3% undecided). Participants completed measures of attitudes and identity.

Measures

Participants completed the same measures as Study 1. They were asked about what the majority supported, their opinion on the issue (Issue 1: 1 = Unacceptable; 6 = Acceptable; Issue 2: 1 = Current Laws are about Right; 6 = Enact More Laws), the time of their decision, prior knowledge, the relevance of the poll to decisions, perceived representation of men and women in the poll, national and gender identification (See Appendix H).

Participants were asked about how important each issue was to men and women on a 1-7 Likert-type scale (*1 = Not at all Important; 7 = Very Important*) and personal importance of the issue on a 7 pt Likert-type scale (*1 = Not at all Important; 7 = Very Important*).

I created a measure of politics (M = 4.11; SD = 2.49 r = -.81) by averaging self-reported political ideology (10-point semantic differential scale; 0 = liberal; 9 = conservative) and self-reported political party affiliation (10-point semantic differential scale; 0 = Republican; 9 = Democrat; reverse scored). Politics was used as a covariate in all analyses.

Results

Manipulation Check

Nine participants were excluded from the KU sample due to a presentation error in the survey code. Four KU participants were excluded because they indicated they did not know the correct answer in response to the manipulation check. This leaves 198 participants for analysis.

Issue 1: Grocery Discount Cards

Identification.

***American identification*.** I conducted a 2 (Gender: Male, Female) × 2 (Poll Condition: Program is Unacceptable, Program is Acceptable) × 2 (Majority Condition: Women Minority, Women Majority) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on American identification with politics and participant type (Student, M-turk worker) as covariates. Politics and participant type were used as covariates in all analyses. There was a marginally significant main effect of majority condition, $F(1, 187) = 3.41$, $p = .066$, $f = .14$ (See Table 14 for means and standard deviations; See Tables 15-17 for correlations; Table 18 for effect sizes); American identification was higher when women were the minority ($M = 5.60$, $SD = 1.41$) versus majority ($M = 5.34$, $SD = 1.63$). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .18. Participants had higher American identification when women were a minority compared to a majority of the poll across gender and poll condition.

***Gender identification*.** I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on gender identification. There were no significant main effects or interactions, ps > .20. Gender identification was not influenced by participant gender or polling information.

Perceived Representation. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed gender groups as represented in the poll with gender, poll condition, and majority condition as between-subjects factors, perceived group representation as

a within-subjects factor. There was a marginally significant four-way interaction, $F(1, 187) = 3.14$, $p = .078$ (See Figure 10).

Men and women viewed men as more represented when women were a minority versus majority of the poll both when the majority found the grocery discount cards unacceptable (Men: $F(1, 187) = 4.78$, $p = .030$, $f = .16$; Women: $F(1, 187) = 4.35$, $p = .038$, $f = .15$) and acceptable (Men: $F(1, 187) = 13.71$, $p < .001$, $f = .27$; Women: $F(1, 187) = 7.53$, $p = .007$, $f = .20$).

Women and men viewed women as significantly more represented when women were a majority versus minority when the majority of the poll found the grocery program acceptable (Men: $F(1, 187) = 4.89$, $p = .028$, $f = .16$; Women: $F(1, 187) = 3.01$, $p = .084$, $f = .13$). Women, but not men, viewed women as significantly more represented when women were a majority versus minority of the poll when the majority of the poll found the grocery program unacceptable, women: $F(1, 187) = 16.72$, $p < .001$, $f = .30$; men: $p = .109$. Manipulation of gender representation was largely successful. Men were viewed as more represented when they were presented as a majority of the sample versus the minority in both poll conditions and across genders. Women were viewed as more represented when they were presented as the majority versus the minority by women in both poll conditions, but only by men in the condition in which the majority found the program acceptable (though means trended in the expected direction when the majority found the program unacceptable).

Women viewed women as more represented when women were a majority of the poll and a majority of the poll thought grocery discount cards were unacceptable versus acceptable, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.27$, $p = .040$, $f = .15$. No other differences within participant gender within gender majority condition were significant, ps > .15. Results indicate poll condition only affected perceived gender representation of women by women when women were the majority;

otherwise, the poll condition had no effect. This is consistent with hypotheses—counterbalancing condition should not affect perceived representation. Women may have perceived women as more represented when women were a majority and the poll was unacceptable versus acceptable potentially because the poll validated pre-existing opinions.

Women viewed women as more represented than did men when women were a majority of the poll and the majority found the program unacceptable, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 9.63$, $p = .002$, $f = .23$. No other differences within participant gender within gender majority condition were significant, ps > .35. Results indicate the only difference between participant genders in perceived representation of target gender occurred when women were a majority and a poll majority thought the program was unacceptable. This indicates the manipulation of poll condition and gender majority condition largely influenced men and women equally.

Women and men viewed men as more represented than women when women were a minority of the poll and the majority of the poll saw the program as unacceptable (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 2.90$, $p = .091$, $f = .12$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.76$, $p = .030$, $f = .16$) and as acceptable (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.79$, $p = .030$, $f = .16$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.49$, $p = .063$, $f = .14$). Women and men viewed men as less represented than women when women were a majority of the poll and the majority viewed the program as unacceptable (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.06$, $p = .045$, $f = .15$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 16.23$, $p < .001$, $f = .29$) and as acceptable (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 13.63$, $p < .001$, $f = .27$; Women: $F(1, 187) = 6.43$, $p = .012$, $f = .18$). Across poll conditions and participants gender, people viewed women were viewed as more represented than men when women were a majority of the poll sample and less represented than women when women were a minority of the poll sample. This is consistent with hypotheses and manipulations—the gender

majority condition affected men and women equally within poll condition.

Perceived Relevance to Gender. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine perceived gender-relevance of the issue with gender, poll condition, and majority condition as between-subjects factors and perceived group relevance as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant three-way interaction between gender condition, participant gender, and relevance to gender, $F(1, 187) = 4.48$, $p = .036$, $f = .15$. Women saw grocery discount cards as more relevant to women when women were the majority versus minority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.87$, $p = .051$, $f = .14$. No other effects were significant within gender, ps > .23. When women were the majority, women saw the issue as more relevant to women than did men, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 13.08$, $p < .001$, $f = .26$. No other differences between gender within majority condition were significant, ps > .24.

When women were the minority, women and men viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men, Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 15.33$, $p < .001$, $f = .29$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 8.07$, $p = .005$, $f = .21$. When women were the majority, women and men viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men, Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 7.67$, $p = .006$, $f = .20$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 34.40$, $p < .001$, $f = .43$.

As expected, women viewed the issue as more relevant to women when women were the majority versus minority and as more relevant than did men when women were the majority. Men were unaffected by gender majority manipulation. Across conditions, women and men viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men.

Bandwagoning by Gender. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll Condition) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects on bandwagoning by gender. There was a significant interaction between poll condition and gender, $F(1, 187) = 6.04$, $p = .015$, $f = .18$ (See Figure

11). Men and women accepted the program more when the majority of the poll found the program acceptable (M_{men} = 3.63, SD_{men} = 1.78; M_{women} = 4.50, SD_{women} = 1.68) versus unacceptable (M_{men} = 2.78, SD_{men} = 1.87; M_{women} = 2.32, SD_{women} = 1.78), Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 7.49$, $p = .007$, $f = .20$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 31.38$, $p < .001$, $f = .41$. Men and women found the program more acceptable when that was the majority opinion.

Women accepted the program more than did men when the majority of the poll found the program acceptable, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.81$, $p = .030$, $f = .16$, but not unacceptable, simple effects $p = .198$. Though men and women both bandwagoned, women did so more when the norm was to support the program.

There was a significant interaction between participant gender and majority condition, $F(1, 187) = 3.96$, $p = .048$, $f = .15$. Women, but not men accepted the program significantly more when women were the majority (women: M = 3.95, SD = 1.96; men: M = 3.05, SD = 1.83) versus minority of the poll (women: M = 3.10, SD = 2.04; men: M = 3.25, SD = 1.92), women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 5.01$, $p = .026$, $f = .16$; men: simple effects $p = .647$. Women supported the program marginally more than did men when women were the majority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.48$, $p = .064$, $f = .14$, but not when women were the minority, simple effects $p = .338$. Women were influenced to like the program more when women were the majority of the poll sample. Gender majority did not interact with poll condition, so it cannot be concluded from this interaction that bandwagoning depended on group representation.

The interaction between majority condition and poll condition and the three-way interaction between gender, poll condition, and majority condition were not significant, ps > .53.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I calculated the extent to which participants saw their gender as represented (i.e., women perceived women as represented

and men saw men as represented). I created a bandwagoning score by standardizing participants' opinions on acceptability of the grocery cards within condition and reverse scoring participants' opinion in the condition when the majority found the program unacceptable. I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 3. There were no significant main effects or interactions between majority condition, gender, and perceived gender representation on bandwagoning, *p*s > .64. Perceived representation of one's gender did not affect tendency to bandwagon.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. American and gender identification did not significantly moderate the effect of majority condition and gender on bandwagoning, *p*s > .20.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Relevance. I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 3. I calculated the extent to which participants perceived the issue as relevant to their gender (i.e., men's perceived relevance to men, women's perceived relevance to women). The three-way interaction between gender, majority condition, and perceived relevance to one's gender was not significant, $p = .160$. There was a significant interaction between majority condition and perceived relevance, $\beta = -.74$, $SE = .34$, $p = .032$, *95% CI* [-1.41, -.06]. I probed the interaction using Preacher's probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). Participants who perceived low relevance to their gender (-1 *SD*), were not affected by majority condition, simple slope $p = .269$. People at medium (*M*) and high (+1 *SD*) levels of perceived gender relevance bandwagoned less when women were the majority versus the minority, simple slopes medium: $\beta = -1.01$, $SE = .48$, $p = .034$; high: $\beta = -2.08$, $SE = .67$, $p = .002$.

There was a significant interaction between gender and perceived relevance, $\beta = -.75$, *SE*

= .37, p = .047, *95% CI* [-1.48, -.01]. Participants who perceived low (-1 SD) and medium (M) relevance did not differ by gender, simple slope ps > .320. At high (+1 SD) levels of perceived gender relevance women bandwagoned less than did men, simple slopes β = -1.58, SE = .66, p = .017. The interaction between gender and majority condition was not significant, p = .451.

Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. There was a significant main effect of gender on prior knowledge of the issue, $F(1, 187) = 4.48$, p = .036, f = .15; men reported greater prior knowledge (M = 2.99, SD = 1.86) than did women (M = 2.48, SD = 1.78), even though people perceived the poll issue as more relevant to women. No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .19. Polling information did not affect perceived prior knowledge of the program.

There was a marginally significant interaction between poll condition and gender on perceived importance of the issue, $F(1, 187) = 3.36$, p = .068, f = .14.When the program was viewed as unacceptable by the majority, women viewed the program as more important than men, simple effects, $F(1, 187) = 6.10$, p = .014, f = .18. There were no significant differences between participants by gender when the majority found the program acceptable, simple effects p = .912. Women, but not men, viewed the issue as more important when the majority thought the program was unacceptable versus acceptable, women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.48$, p = .064, f = .14; men: simple effects p = .519. There were no significant interactions or main effects on perceived influence of the poll, ps > .18. Women perceived the program as more important when the majority thought it was unacceptable compared to acceptable and compared to men. Poll condition did not influence the extent to which men viewed the programs as important and importance of the program did not differ by gender majority condition.

Men and women marginally differed in the timing of opinion, $\chi^2(4) = 8.84$, p = .065. Men

were more likely to have decided "Just now" (n = 75) and earlier than a month ago (n = 36) compared to women ($n_{just\ now}$ = 67; $n_{before\ that}$ = 12), ps < .05. Men and women did not significantly differ in any other cells. Men appear to be more polarized in the timing of their decision than women—they were more likely to have decided very early or at the last minute.

Issue 2

Identification.

***American identification*.** I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition: Keep current laws, Enact more laws) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on American identification. There was a marginally significant main effect of majority condition, $F(1, 187) = 3.27$, $p = .072$, $f = .13$; American identification was higher when women were the minority (M = 5.60, SD = 1.41) versus majority (M = 5.34, SD = 1.63; See Table 19 for means and standard deviations; Tables 20-22 for correlations; Table23 for effect sizes). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .14. Men and women did not differ in American identification. Participants had higher American identification when women were a minority of the sample.

Gender identification. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender on gender identification. There were no significant main effects or interactions, ps > .10.

Contrary to expectations, participants did not differ by gender in gender identification. Poll condition and gender majority condition did not affect gender identification.

Perceived Representation. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed gender groups as represented in the poll with gender, poll condition, and majority condition as between-subjects factors, perceived group representation as

a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between poll condition and perceived representation, $F(1, 187) = 10.59$, $p = .001$, $f = .24$ (See Table 23; Figure 12). People viewed women as more represented when the majority supported enacting more laws ($M = 5.08$, $SD = 1.67$) versus current laws ($M = 4.30$, $SD = 1.74$), simple effects $F(1, 187) = 13.05$, $p < .001$, $f = .26$. Perceived representation of men did not significantly differ by condition, simple effects $p = .304$. Women were perceived as more represented than men ($M = 4.27$, $SD = 1.55$) when the majority supported enacting more laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 14.06$, $p < .001$, $f = .27$, but not current laws, simple effects $p = .425$. Women were perceived as more represented when the majority supported more equal pay laws compared to current laws and compared to men.

There was a significant interaction between gender majority condition and perceived representation, $F(1, 187) = 121.79$, $p < .001$, $f = .81$. People perceived men as more represented when women were a minority ($M = 5.22$, $SD = 1.24$) versus majority ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.50$), simple effects $F(1, 187) = 74.77$, $p < .001$, $f = .63$. People perceived women as less represented when women were a minority ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.69$) versus majority ($M = 5.50$, $SD = 1.37$), simple effects $F(1, 187) = 56.98$, $p < .001$, $f = .55$. Men were perceived as more represented than women when women were the minority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 39.28$, $p < .001$, $f = .46$. Women were perceived as more represented than men when women were the majority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 87.49$, $p < .001$, $f = .68$. Data indicate the gender manipulation was effective—women were perceived as more represented when they were the poll majority and men were perceived as more represented when they were the poll majority.

No other interaction was significant, ps > .13.

Perceived Relevance to Gender. I conducted a mixed model ANOVA to examine the extent to which participants viewed the issue as relevant to gender with gender, poll condition,

and majority condition as between-subjects factors, perceived group relevance as a within-subjects factor. There was a marginally significant three-way interaction between gender condition, participant gender, and relevance to gender, $F(1, 187) = 3.53$, $p = .062$, $f = .14$.

Women saw the issue as more relevant to women when women were the majority versus minority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 5.69$, $p = .018$, $f = .18$. Women saw the issue as less relevant to men when women were the majority versus minority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 2.95$, $p = .087$, $f = .13$. Men did not differ in perceived relevance to men and women between gender majority conditions, ps > .29. Gender majority of the sample affected women's perception of gender relevance of the issue, but not men's perception of gender relevance.

When women were the minority, women saw the issue as less relevant to women than did men, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 5.22$, $p = .023$, $f = .17$. No other differences in perceived gender representation within majority condition were significant by participant gender, ps > .36. Except when judging relevance to women when women were a minority, men and women did not differ in perceived relevance to men and women within gender majority condition.

Men and women viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men when women were the minority (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 78.10$, $p < .001$, $f = .65$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 32.27$, $p < .001$, $f = .42$) and when women were the majority (Men: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 88.58$, $p < .001$, $f = .69$; Women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 90.66$, $p < .001$, $f = .70$). People viewed the issue as more relevant to women than to men across gender majority conditions and participant genders.

No other high-order interactions were significant, ps > .20.

Bandwagoning by Gender. I conducted a 2 (Gender) × 2 (Poll condition) × 2 (Majority Condition) ANOVA to examine poll effects by gender. There was a marginally significant three-

way interaction between poll condition, majority condition, and participant gender, $F(1, 187) = 2.80$, $p = .096$, $f = .12$ (See Figure 13).

When their gender subgroup was a minority, both women and men supported equal pay laws marginally more when the poll majority supported enacting more laws versus current laws, women: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.05$, $p = .083$, $f = .13$; men: simple effects, $F(1, 187) = 2.86$, $p = .093$, $f = .12$. Men and women did not significantly differ based on poll condition when their gender was a majority, simple effects ps > .80. Women supported equal pay laws more when women were a minority and the majority supported enacting more equal pay laws compared to current laws, but men did not differ by poll condition when women were a minority. When men were a minority, however, men supported equal pay laws more when the majority supported equal pay laws compared to current laws, but women did not differ by poll condition.

Women supported enacting more laws when the majority of the poll supported enacting more laws and women were the minority versus majority of the sample, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 6.87$, $p = .009$, $p = .19$. No other differences within poll conditions were significant, ps > .16. Counter to expectations, women were influenced by the poll majority more when their group was a minority, but only when the majority opinion supported equal pay.

Women supported enacting equal pay laws more than did men when women were the minority of the poll and the majority of the poll supported current laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 6.62$, $p = .011$, $f = .19$, and enacting more laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 16.95$, $p < .001$, $f = .30$. Women supported equal pay laws marginally more than did men when women were the majority of the poll and the poll majority supported current laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.10$, $p = .08$, $f = .13$, but not when the majority supported enacting more laws, simple effects $p = .984$. Women supported enacting equal pay laws more than men in all conditions, except when that

was the majority position and women were in the majority of the poll.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Representation. I calculated the extent to which participants saw their gender as represented (i.e., women perceived women as represented; men saw men as represented). I tested whether perceived representation moderated the effect of gender and gender majority on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 3. There were no significant main effects or interactions, *p*s > .25. Perceived representation of one's gender did not affect tendency to bandwagon, or follow superordinate group norms.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Identification. American and gender identification did not significantly moderate the effect of majority condition and gender on bandwagoning, *p*s > .27.

Bandwagoning Moderated by Perceived Relevance. I tested whether perceived relevance moderated the effect of gender on bandwagoning using the PROCESS Macro for SPSS, Model 3. I calculated participants' perception of the issue as relevant to their gender (i.e., men's perceived relevance to men, women's perceived relevance to women). The three-way interaction between gender, majority condition, and perceived relevance to one's gender was not significant, $p = .146$. There was a significant interaction between majority condition and perceived relevance, $B = -.78$, $SE = .334$, $p = .021$, *95% CI* [-1.44, -.12]. I probed the interaction using Preacher's probing tool (quantpsy.org; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). For people who perceived low (-1 SD) and medium (mean) issue relevance to their gender, gender majority condition did not affect bandwagoning, simple slope *p*s > .19. People who perceived high (+1 SD) issue relevance to their gender bandwagoned less when women were the majority, $\beta = -1.63$, $SE = .83$, $p = .053$. The interactions between gender and majority condition and between gender and perceived relevance were not significant, *p*s > .17.

Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. There was a marginally significant interaction between gender and majority condition on prior knowledge of the issue, $F(1, 187) = 3.08$, $p = .081$, $f = .13$; however, none of the simple effect comparisons were significant, ps > .14. No other interactions were significant, ps > .11. Prior knowledge did not differ by participant gender and was not affected by poll condition or majority condition.

The three-way interaction between poll condition, majority condition, and gender on perceived issue importance was significant, $F(1, 187) = 10.54$, $p = .001$, $f = .24$. Women viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported more laws, when women were the minority versus majority, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 7.43$, $p = .007$, $f = .20$. There were no other significant differences between majority conditions within gender and poll condition, ps > .10.

When the majority support current laws and enacting more laws women marginally viewed the issue as more important than did men when women were the minority, Current laws: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.53$, $p = .062$, $f = .14$; Enacting more laws: simple effects $F(1, 187) = 19.98$, $p < .001$, $f = .33$. Women marginally viewed the issue as more important than did men when women were the majority and the majority supported current laws and, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 17.05$, $p < .001$, $f = .30$, but not when the majority supported enacting current, simple effects $F(1, 187) = .02$, $p = .895$, $f = .00$. Women viewed the issue as more important than did men, except when the majority supported current laws and women were the majority.

Women viewed the issue as more important when women were a majority and when the majority supported current laws versus enacting more laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 4.34$, $p = .039$, $f = .15$. Men marginally viewed the issue as more important when women were a majority and when the majority supported enacting more laws versus current laws, simple effects $F(1, 187) = 3.06$, $p = .082$, $f = .13$. When women were a minority, there were no significant

differences between poll conditions within gender, *p*s > .17. When women were a majority, men and women held opposing views about the importance of the issue depending on poll condition; women viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported current laws while men viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported enacting more laws.

There was no significant interaction or main effects of gender, majority condition, or poll condition on perceived influence of the poll, *p*s > .14. Study conditions did not affect the extent to which participants perceived they were influenced by the poll.

A chi-square test indicated no significant differences between men and women in the timing of opinion (e.g., "Just now," "Before that (one month ago)"), $\chi^2(3) = 4.95$, $p = .175$. Men and women did not differ on when decided their opinion on equal pay laws.

Comparisons between Issues

Gender Representation. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived representation of men with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences by condition, $F(1, 191) = 4.83$, $p = .029$, $f = .16$ (See Figure 14). Men were seen as less represented when women were the majority ($M = 3.79$, $SD = 1.54$) versus minority ($M = 4.91$, $SD = 1.46$) for the grocery card issue, simple effects $F(1, 191) = 27.74$, $p < .001$, $f = .38$, and equal pay issue ($M_{majority} = 3.53$, $SD_{majority} = 1.50$; $M_{minority} = 5.22$, $SD_{minority} = 1.24$), simple effects $F(1, 191) = 27.74$, $p < .001$, $f = .62$. There were no significant differences between issues within majority condition, simple effects *p*s > .10. No other main effects or interactions were significant, *p*s > .10.

I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived representation of women with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There were significant differences by majority condition, $F(1, 191) = 3.84$, $p = .051$, $f =$

.14. Women were seen as more represented when women were the majority (M = 5.10, SD = 1.55) versus minority (M = 4.04, SD = 1.54) for grocery card issue, simple effects $F(1, 191)$ = 23.86, $p < .001$, f = .35, and equal pay issue ($M_{majority}$ = 5.50, $SD_{majority}$ = 1.37; $M_{minority}$ = 3.84, $SD_{minority}$ = 1.69), simple effects $F(1, 191)$ = 53.76, $p < .001$, f = .53. There was a marginally significant difference between issues when women were the majority, $F(1, 191)$ = 3.16, p = .077, f = .13, but not the minority, p = .318. People saw women as more represented in the equal pay than the grocery card issue when women were a majority. There was no significant interaction between gender and gender condition p = .222.

The manipulation of gender representation affected perceived gender representation—men were seen as less represented and women were seen as more represented when women were the majority versus minority of the poll. Men's representation as not affected by poll issue, but women were seen as more represented when they were presented as the majority and the issue was about equal pay (more gender-relevant) compared to grocery cards (less gender-relevant).

Gender Relevance. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived relevance of the issue to men with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There were no significant main effects or interactions, ps > .28. Perceived relevance of the issue to men did not differ by study condition.

I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived relevance of the issue to women with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between participant gender and poll issue, $F(1, 191)$ = 9.47, p = .002, f = .22. Both men and women saw pay equality as more relevant to women (M_{men} = 6.37, SD_{men} = .99; M_{women} = 6.08, SD_{women} = 1.13) than grocery discount cards (M_{men} = 4.63, SD_{men} = 1.02; M_{women} = 5.08, SD_{women} = 1.04), Women: $F(1, 191)$ =

23.61, $p < .001$, $f = .35$; Men: $F(1, 191) = 109.52$, $p < .001$, $f = .76$. No other interactions were significant, $p > .70$. People perceived the equal pay issue as more relevant to woman than the grocery discount cards regardless of gender.

Bandwagoning. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine bandwagoning with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and bandwagoning (using the variable calculated to collapse across conditions) for each issue as a within-subjects factor. There was a marginally significant three-way interaction between participant gender, majority condition, and agreement with the poll majority, $F(1, 191) = 3.29$, $p = .071$, $f = .13$ (See Figure 15).

Women bandwagoned marginally more for the grocery card compared to the equal pay issue, when women were the majority, simple effects $F(1, 191) = 2.98$, $p = .086$, $f = .12$. Women bandwagoned significantly more than men for the grocery card issue when women were the majority, $F(1, 191) = 7.20$, $p = .008$, $f = .19$; and marginally more for the equal pay issue when women were the minority, simple effects $F(1, 191) = 2.91$, $p = .088$, $f = .12$. No other differences simple effects were significant, ps > .13.

When women were a majority, women were more likely to bandwagon for the grocery card issue, compared to the equal pay issue. Women were more likely than men to bandwagon for the grocery card issue when women were the majority. However, for the equal pay issue women were more likely than men to bandwagon when women were the *minority*.

Individual Cognitions about the Poll and Poll Issue. I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine prior exposure to information about the issue with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and prior knowledge of each poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of issue, $F(1, 191) = 58.31$, $p < .001$, $f = .55$. Participants had significantly greater prior knowledge of equal pay ($M = 5.35$, $SD = 1.69$) than of

grocery discount programs (M = 2.78, SD = 1.84). No interactions were significant, ps > .11. Participants reported greater prior knowledge of the equal pay issue than the grocery cards issue, but reported exposure to the issue did not differ by participant gender. I expected participants would be more familiar with equal pay than with grocery discount cards because equal pay is frequently discussed (for example Equal Pay Day is designed to encourage discussion of the issue) while grocery cards are frequently used, but discussed less frequently. I expected women may be more familiar with equal pay issues than men because equal pay is more in their self-interest, but this expectation was not supported.

I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived importance of the issue with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and reported importance of poll issue as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant interaction between participant gender and issue, $F(1, 191) = 9.39$, $p = .003$, $f = .22$. Both men and women saw pay equality as more important ($M_{men} = 4.20$, $SD_{men} = 1.71$; $M_{women} = 5.53$, $SD_{women} = 1.56$) than grocery discount cards ($M_{men} = 3.06$, $SD_{men} = 1.66$; $M_{women} = 3.36$, $SD_{women} = 1.47$), Men: $F(1, 191) = 40.47$, $p < .001$, $f = .46$; Women: $F(1, 191) = 89.52$, $p < .001$, $f = .68$. Women thought pay equality was more important than did men, $F(1, 191) = 28.14$, $p < .001$, $f = .38$, but importance of grocery cards did not differ by gender, $p = .115$. No other interactions were significant, ps > .24. As expected, women perceived equal pay as more important than did men. Perceived importance of the grocery cards issue did not differ by participant gender.

I conducted a mixed-model ANOVA to examine perceived influence from the poll with gender and majority condition as between-subjects factors and reported influence of the poll as a within-subjects factor. No main effects or interactions were significant, ps > .45. Gender relevance of the poll issue, gender majority, and participant gender did not affect self-reported

influence from the polling information, despite differences in influence across gender-relevant conditions by participant gender and gender majority.

Self-reported timing of the participants' decision differed by relevance of the issue to gender, $\chi^2(12) = 108.32$, $p < .001$. For the grocery card issue, participants were more likely to have decided their stance "Just now" (n = 142) compared to "Before that" (n = 48), but for the equal pay issue participants were more likely to have decided their stance "Before that" (n = 133) compared to "Just now" (n = 53). For both issues, there was a tendency for participants to be polarized in the timing of decision (either "Just now" or "Before that") with only 17 participants reporting decisions in between for either issue. Differences between poll issue conditions appeared for both men, $\chi^2(12) = 124.21$, $p < .001$, and women, $\chi^2(9) = 17.72$, $p = .039$.

Study 3 Discussion

Women and men bandwagoned equally when the issue was less relevant to gender (data sharing grocery discount cards). When the issue was more gender-relevant (equal pay laws), women were influenced by the poll opinion more when their group was underrepresented and the majority opinion supported enacting more equal pay laws compared to when the majority supported current laws, contrary to hypotheses. Participants did not differ in support for enacting more equal pay laws between any other poll conditions. Overall, women supported equal pay laws more than did men except when their gender was represented and equal pay laws were the majority opinion. As expected, women were more likely to bandwagon for the less gender-relevant issue than the more gender-relevant issue when women were the majority (represented). Bandwagoning was not influenced by *perceived* representation for either issue or gender. Manipulation checks indicate manipulations of gender majority status were effective; participants saw women as more represented when they were presented as a majority of the poll

sample compared to men and compared to when they were presented as a minority. Men were seen as more represented when they were presented as a majority of the poll sample compared to women and compared to when they were presented as a minority.

Results provided mixed support for hypotheses. Women did not identify with the nation less than men or with their gender more than did men (Hypothesis 1). Women and men did see their subgroup as more represented when their subgroup was presented as the majority versus the minority of the poll sample (Hypothesis 2). Women did not bandwagon less overall than men (Hypothesis 3). Women and men both bandwagoned for the grocery card issue (Issue 1); men and women differed in bandwagoning on equal pay (Issue 2). Subgroup representation did affect bandwagoning, but in inconsistent patterns (Hypothesis 4). For the grocery card issue (Issue 1), only women bandwagoned when their group was a majority versus a minority. For the equal pay issue, women and men bandwagoned when their group was *a minority*, but not a majority. Perceived representation did not moderate bandwagon effects. Data partially supported hypothesis 5—women were more likely than men to bandwagon when their group was represented for the grocery card issue (less gender-relevant issue) than the equal pay issue (more gender-relevant issue) and women were more likely to bandwagon for the grocery issue compared to the equal pay issue when their group was represented. Participants bandwagoned less when women were the majority and the issue (for both issues) was seen as gender-relevant. For the grocery card issue, women bandwagoned less than men when they perceived the issue as relevant to their gender. The grocery card issue was still viewed as more relevant to women than to men, and was not entirely gender-neutral.

The relevance of the issue may influence processing information (Mackie, 1987). When the issue is less relevant to subgroup interests, people may use the group as a heuristic cue—

especially when a typically underrepresented group sees their group is well-represented. When the issue is gender-relevant, however, participants may engage in more effortful processing. Women were less likely to follow superordinate group norms when women were represented for a gender-relevant issue compared to a gender-irrelevant issue—women were less likely to use poll norms or representation as a heuristic cue.

Why did women bandwagon regardless of representation for a less gender-relevant issue, but bandwagoned more, or did not bandwagon, when they were underrepresented in a gender-relevant poll? When women's opinions are represented, they feel freer to express opinions independent of poll influence. But women may be energized to support gender-relevant positions when those positons are supported by the majority of a group even when the subgroup is underrepresented. McDonald and colleagues (2013) showed people were motivated by conflict between norms to engage in pro-environmental behavior when they held pre-existing pro-environmental attitudes. Similarly, women may see their opinion expression as more effective to influencing the superordinate group when the superordinate group supports gender equality (assuming women support equal pay laws), but there is still conflict within the superordinate group. In contrast, women may be demotivated to take action in support of women's interest when they are a minority and the superordinate group supports maintaining the status quo. Superordinate group support for the status quo may signal that engaging in a behavior is not effective because not everybody is acting or the behavior will not achieve the desired outcome (Olson, 1971; Ellen, Winer, & Cobb-Walgren, 1991). Without a measure of women's prior attitudes, it cannot be concluded women are energized when they are underrepresented, but supported by the majority, and demotivated when women are underrepresented and not supported by the majority. Prior attitudes should be assessed in future research to gain a more

accurate understanding of attitude changes from polls.

I expected men would have higher national identification than would women because they have greater control over material and symbolic resources (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and women would have higher gender identification than men. Contrary to these expectations, men and women did not differ in identification. Gender majority condition unexpectedly did influence national identification; participants had higher identification when women were a minority, rather than a majority of the sample. It is possible national identification was higher when women were a minority, because this condition reifies a masculine construction of U.S. national identification (Van Berkel et al., 2016). People may have identified with the nation when the poll sample reflected gender disparities present in national representations.

Manipulation of gender relevance was partially successful. People viewed the gender-relevant issue, equal pay, as more relevant to women than the gender-irrelevant issue, grocery discount cards. Relevance of the issue to men did not differ by issue type. People perceived both issues as more relevant to women than to men, contrary to expectations. The grocery store discount cards were intended to be gender-neutral, as this issue sharing data with third parties is not unique to one gender. However, people may perceive grocery cards as more relevant to women than to men because traditional gender roles dictate that women grocery shop more than men (e.g., Schafer & Schafer, 1989). This is may be especially true for undergraduate freshmen, who are less likely to grocery shop than M-turk participants.

Perceived personal importance differed by poll condition. For the less gender-relevant issue, women, but not men, viewed the program as more important when the majority found the program unacceptable versus acceptable. For the gender-relevant issue, women viewed the issue as more important when the majority supported current laws, while men viewed the issue as

more important when the majority supported enacting more equal pay laws. Differences in issue importance by gender may reflect pre-existing attitudes—men and women view the issue as more important when the superordinate group favors policies that "disadvantage" their gender subgroup. Men and women both viewed pay equality as more important than grocery cards.

Prior knowledge of either issue, perceived impact of the poll, and timing of opinion did not predict tendency to bandwagon.

General Discussion

I expected low-status subgroup members would identify with the national, superordinate group less than would high-status subgroup members (Hypothesis 1; See Table 1). Across three studies, this hypothesis was not supported. Low-status and high-status subgroup members in terms of race and gender did not differ in national identification—in contrast to the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis (Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010; Van Berkel et al., 2016). In Study 2A, Latino/a Americans had *higher* levels of national identification.

I expected low-status subgroup members would see themselves as less represented in national polls than will high-status subgroup members (Hypothesis 2). As expected, participants saw White Americans (the high status subgroup) as more represented than racial minorities (relatively low-status subgroups) in Studies 1-2. Representation manipulations were effective in Study 3. People saw women as more represented than men when they were the majority and compared to when women were the minority. People saw men as more represented than women when they were the majority and compared to when men were the minority.

I predicted low-status subgroup members would bandwagon less than high-status subgroup members because they would see their group as less represented and identified with the superordinate group (Hypothesis 3). Results provided mixed evidence. All studies showed a

fairly consistent pattern of bandwagoning—people followed the superordinate group norms. Members of low-status subgroup tended to bandwagon equal to or *more* than members of high-status subgroups with two exceptions: in Study 2A, Black Americans did not bandwagon and in Study 2B, Asian Americans did not bandwagon, though this trend was not significant.

There was only minor support for the main hypothesis (Hypothesis 4)—that bandwagoning depends on viewing one's subgroup as represented. In Study 1, Black Americans' adherence to superordinate group norms did depend on perceived representation, though they bandwagoned more than White Americans. This pattern did not appear in Study 2. In Study 3, women and men both bandwagoned for a less gender-relevant issue independent of whether their gender subgroup was a majority or a minority. Women actually bandwagoned more on a more gender-relevant issue when women were a *minority* versus a majority of the poll sample.

Study 3 provided evidence that, as expected (Hypothesis 5), relevance of the issue to subgroup interests affected adherence to superordinate group norms. When the issue was less gender-relevant, both men and women bandwagoned; however, when the issue was more gender-relevant, bandwagon effects diminished for women. Women and men saw equal pay laws as more relevant to women than grocery discount cards, the grocery discount cards were still seen as more relevant to women than to men—the issue was not entirely gender-neutral as intended. Participants bandwagoned less when women were the majority and the issue was seen as gender-relevant. Women bandwagoned less than did men when they perceived the issue as gender-relevant for the less gender-relevant issue.

Relevance may encourage people to use systematic, central processing (e.g., Trost et al., 1992); people may have been less likely to use the polling information as a heuristic cue when the issue is subgroup-relevant. Johnson and Eagly (1989) note three types of self-relevance in

persuasion messages: value-relevant involvement, outcome-relevant involvement, and impression relevant involvement. It is likely in these particular studies that an association between an attitude and the self will be activated because participants should be concerned about impression relevant involvement (fitting in with their ingroup) and outcome relevant involvement (the issue may have been salient with a participant's subgroup's goals—equal pay, social security benefits). People with high involvement based on outcome and impression management tend to be less persuaded than people with low involvement, or persuaded only by strong, but not weak arguments (Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).

A limitation of assessing relevance in the current work was the use of within-subjects design. All participants viewed the gender-relevant issue second in Study 3 and relevance was a possible explanation for Study 2 subgroup differences, but was not assessed directly. Bandwagoning may have decreased for a gender-relevant issue because participants ascertained the study purpose and resisted influence. Future studies should further explore the role of relevance by randomly assigning participants to comparable subgroup relevant versus subgroup irrelevant issues (between-subjects design) or by randomizing the order of issue presentation.

Social Norms or Anchoring?

Bandwagoning occurred across all three studies for some subgroups. When the majority of a poll indicated a particular stance on an issue, participants were more likely to take the same stance. There were a few exceptions to bandwagon effects, but little consistency in norm-resisting subgroup characteristics. Study 3 provides partial evidence bandwagoning may not occur for some group members when the issue is of special interest to their subgroup. Membership in a historically disenfranchised subgroup does not predict lower levels of bandwagoning overall, counter to predictions. Even though participants saw high-status groups

as more represented than low-status groups in national polls and accurately perceived manipulated majorities, low-status subgroup participants did not have lower superordinate group identification and were not less likely to follow superordinate group norms.

It is possible people did not follow the poll as a social cue necessarily, but that the poll provided an anchor on which participants based judgments. Because participants did not differ by perceived representation (with one exception in Study 1) participants may have used the poll as an anchor regardless of group affiliation. Participants may have used the poll as a starting point on which to adjust attitudes—they decided whether they agreed more or less than the group in an anchor-and-adjustment type process (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In deciding their opinion, participants may be more likely to start with the majority opinion as an anchor and selectively generate or access knowledge consistent with the majority opinion and less likely to generate arguments for the opposition (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). This may also explain why bandwagoning was diminished for the more versus less gender-relevant issue in Study 3—the poll margins were narrower. Bandwagoning effects sizes were similarly smaller for the smaller poll margin in Study 2A compared to Study 2B (except for Asian Americans). Much of the research on anchoring focuses on numerical (e.g., the year of an election, the average temperature), not attitudinal judgements. I asked participants about their judgments on a scale with greater point range than were presented in the poll (categorical, discrete choices)—it is therefore unclear if participants used poll as an anchor to a different rating scale.

If the poll provided socially normative information about the acceptability of the polling issue to the (sub)group, then we might expect attitudes to generalize to other related attitudes. Participants should not necessarily generalize attitudes if the group information only provided an anchor point for a specific survey item. In Studies 1 and 2, when participants were asked about

related attitudes, generalization did not occur. Although a poll indicated more or less favorable attitudes toward Apple, the DOJ, Social Security, and free trade, participants tended to follow the superordinate group norm in answering the poll questions themselves, but did not generalize answers to the poll question to attitudes about the target parties (e.g., followed the norm in whether free trade "was a good thing" in response to the poll question, but did not differ by condition in opinion of free trade generally). Poll questions and general attitudes were correlated overall (*r*s = -.89-.33), except for social security (*r* = .04). Polling information may have provided a social anchor for participants' answers to the polling question rather than influencing formation of attitudes about the issue and parties involved.

It is possible subgroups did not differ in the extent to which they followed the opinion in the poll, but differed by status in *how* the poll was used. High-status subgroups, for example may have used the poll as social information, while low-status subgroups used the poll as an anchor—though this prediction is not supported by subgroup differences in generalization. Future studies should further investigate the extent to which the poll serves as an anchor or as a norm by asking participants comparing their attitudes to the group or using the group as a source of information. One could manipulate the instructions to prime participants to use the poll as an anchor or as normative information. Use of a poll from an outgroup would assist in teasing apart whether the poll provides cognitive anchors to base judgments or provides socially normative information that shapes judgement based on identity.

Social Norms and Similarity

As expected, racial minorities were viewed as less represented than racial majorities. Based on self-categorization theory and the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010; Turner et al., 1987), I expected racial minorities would perceive

themselves as less similar to the superordinate group and this difference in perceived similarity would cause minorities to be less influenced by the superordinate norms. High status subgroups have greater control in shaping the superordinate group through access to symbolic and material resources (e.g., Pratto et al., 2006). Disproportionate control of a superordinate group can lead to greater inter-subgroup competition as subgroups strive to optimize positive, distinctive characteristics (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Contrary to expectations, perceived representation did not affect tendency to follow superordinate group norms.

This expected relationship between group representation and adherence to norms may not have occurred because representation is not necessarily the same as perceived similarity. I only assessed participants' perception of their subgroup as represented within the superordinate group and perception of the issue in question as important to their group—I did not assess perceived similarity to the superordinate group. Given that subgroups did not reliably differ based on group status, it is unlikely subgroup differences in perceived similarity would have explained homogeneity among group members or differences in perceived similarity would have emerged among subgroup members. Additional research on perceived similarity to the superordinate group, in addition, to representation, could help explain when subgroups or individuals do (not) follow larger group norms.

The poll information used in the current research did not include an explicit outgroup. I expected low-status subgroup members would see the superordinate group as less central to their identity than high-status subgroup members, but all participants belonged to the superordinate group (American). It is unclear if subgroups would have differed to the same magnitude in following norms between a superordinate ingroup (e.g., Americans) compared to an outgroup (e.g., Australians). If low-status, but not high-status subgroup members, do not differ in

following an outgroup versus superordinate group norm, this may still provide support for the central hypotheses—that superordinate group norms are less influential in shaping low-status than high-status subgroup members' attitudes—by providing a comparison source of influence.

Perceived Fairness of Underrepresentation

While low-status subgroup members saw themselves as less represented in the national polls than did high-status subgroups, this did not translate to differences in national identification. Of the 104 tested correlations between perceived representation and national/racial/gender identification, only nine were statistically significant (~8.7%, $p = .964$) and were relatively small correlations (rs < .32). This suggests that representation and identification are viewed distinctly by participants. Though one's group may not be central in the representation of the superordinate group, this did not affect the centrality of the superordinate group to one's identity across subgroups. Seeing one's group as underrepresented did not lead participants to distance themselves from the larger group and distance from the larger group did not affect perceived representation. Hornsey and colleagues (2003) similarly found group power (operationalized as group representation in a superordinate group council) did not change group identification, though Hornsey and colleagues only measured identification with an immediate group and not a superordinate group. When power, or representation is seen as unjust, people tend to distrust the outgroup more (Hornsey et al., 2003). Participants may have perceived underrepresentation as fair and reflective of true differences in the population. Even in Study 3, when I manipulated numerical group representation, I kept representation fairly similar (68% versus 32%), to ensure study information was believable. Participants may not have perceived the distribution as unjust although the manipulation affected perceived representation as expected. If underrepresentation was viewed as illegitimate, people may view the outgroup and

the poll as trustworthy and less informative in shaping attitudes (Hornsey et al., 2003). Future work should ask about perceived legitimacy or maximize the underrepresentation of groups to examine the effects of legitimacy on identification and adherence to superordinate group norms.

Subgroup status. Results do not support my expectations that subgroup status would affect bandwagoning. I expected, because high-status groups have greater control in shaping the superordinate group (Pratto et al., 2006; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), they would see themselves as more similar to the superordinate group and would follow the group norms as a result. Low-status group and high-status groups tended to bandwagon equally and in Study 1, high-status subgroup members bandwagoned *less* than low-status subgroup members.

The groups used in the current research were naturally occurring groups based on national identification, gender and race. Results were mixed across studies as to whether a low-status group adhered to superordinate group norms more, less, or equivalent to a high-status group. Future studies could further test the role of status and group interest by randomly assigning participants to subgroups of varying status levels and randomly assigning poll issues relevant only to randomly assigned groups (e.g., rules for a lab game).

Subgroup Asymmetry Hypothesis

The current research does not support the idea that the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis extends to affect adherence to superordinate group norms. Counter to the subgroup asymmetry hypotheses (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1997; Staerklé et al., 2010), participants did not differ in national identification by race or gender. Expected differences in national identification may not have emerged because of differences in how national identification was assessed. For example, Van Berkel and colleagues (2016) found men and women did not differ in national identification, but did differ in nationalism, or the idea the United States is superior to other nations (Kosterman

& Feshbach, 1989).[3] Participants may have identified with the nation to similar degrees, but identification *expression* may differ by group status. Historically oppressed group tend to express less glorification of the nation (Staerklé et al., 2010) and attachment to the nation generally (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Results are fairly consistent with Horney and Hogg's (2002) research on subgroup relations within superordinate groups—low-status subgroups did not resist categorization at the superordinate group level and high-status subgroup members were actually more protective of their subgroup identity as distinct within the superordinate group.

In accordance with the subgroup asymmetry hypothesis, minority subgroup members had lower correlations between racial/gender and national identification (*r* median = .59) than did majority subgroup members (*r* median = .80). This suggests, racial and gender identification are more closely tied to national identity for high-status subgroups than low-status subgroups, although low-status and high-status groups did not differ overall in identification,.

Conflicting Norms

The current research examined whether subgroups implicitly conflict with the superordinate group—whether they see the larger group norms and interests as separate. Results largely did not support the idea that there was implicit conflict—subgroup members did not follow superordinate group norms differently depending on group status, unless the issue was particularly subgroup relevant. No participants in the current studies had information about the attitudes of their subgroup. Participants in Study 3 only had information about their subgroup representation—not their subgroup's average opinion. Future research should examine explicit conflicts between the superordinate group and the subgroup.

People may follow the group with which they most identify because people follow the

[3] Staerklé and colleagues (2010), however, found a greater magnitude of difference between majorities and minorities in national identification (asked as "closeness to one's country") than in nationalism.

group they are most similar with (e.g., Terry & Hogg, 1996; Terry et al., 1999). Information about subgroup attitudes within a superordinate group attitude (subgroup and superordinate group categorizations are simultaneously salient) can cause greater identification with a subgroup and greater dislike of dissimilar suboutgroups (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000b). People may be more likely to follow the norms of their subgroup over the superordinate group to increase positive differences between the subgroups (Brewer, 1991; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999). Low-status subgroup members may be actually less resistant to superordinate group categorization compared to high-status subgroup members because the superordinate group allows low-status subgroup members to avoid negative self-concept and enhance positive self-concept (Hornsey & Hogg, 2002). If low-status subgroup members are more motivated to identify at the superordinate group level, they may follow a superordinate group norm more than a subgroup norm.

Implications for Behavior

The current studies show people's judgements are influenced by the larger group. It is unclear from the current studies how voting *behavior* would be influenced. For voting behavior to occur, one must decide to vote and then how to vote. According to the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), intention to engage in a behavior is a function of one's attitude toward the behavior and the subjective norm, or belief about whether important others think one should engage in the behavior. The subjective norms primed through polls in these studies show the direction of attitudes about a particular issue, but do not indicate whether other important group members intend to vote on the issue, or vote for representatives that support the issue. Superordinate group norms about a behavior will likely not differ by subgroup membership, but will influence people in similar ways, depending on relevance of the behavioral domain to the individual or subgroup. To shift behavior toward a specific voting outcome, two

superordinate group norms need to work together—the norm to engage in voting behavior and the norm to support a particular issue when engaging in voting.

However, hearing a majority has acted on attitudes and voted accordingly may actually *discourage* an individual from engaging in voting behavior. People are less likely to vote when they hear early election results (Jackson, 1983). The utility of the behavior decreases because an outcome has already been decided, especially if one has negative attitudes towards voting or toward the many behavioral steps required to vote (e.g., registering, waiting in line, etc.). Similarly, people behave opposite a social norm when they believe their behavior surpasses a group standard, unless they are also given injunctive normative information (Schultz et al., 2007). Thus for a superordinate group attitudinal norm to translate into behavior, it is important for norms to exist at the level of attitudes and behaviors, and with both injunctive and descriptive norms about the approval and importance of the behavior.

Conclusion

Subgroup members did not reliably differ in adherence to superordinate group norms, in the context of American national identity. Study 3 provided evidence that subgroups may not bandwagon when an issue is particularly relevant to their subgroup interest, but this requires replication with clearer manipulations of relevance. Although perceived subgroup representation depended on group status and sample characteristics in manipulations, differences in identification with the superordinate group did not emerge as expected. Although the current studies did not show consistent differences in adherence to superordinate group norms based in subgroup representation and status, consistent bandwagon effects emerged and the studies suggest differences may emerge from a group's interest in the issue. Results of this work require further replication and conclusion about subgroup interest should be validated further by testing

adherence to superordinate group norms when superordinate and subgroup interests explicitly conflict. Greater understanding of the dynamics between superordinate groups and subgroups can help target normative interventions to reach the intended population and can facilitate understanding how poll affect voters intentions and behaviors—whether or not polls are problematic to the democratic process and whether they are problematic for some Americans more than others.

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Table 1.
Results and hypothesis across studies

	Was this hypothesis supported?					
	Hypothesis 1: Low-status subgroup members will identify with the national, superordinate group less than will high-status subgroup members	Hypothesis 2: Low-status subgroup members will see themselves as less represented in national polls than will high-status subgroup members	Hypothesis 3: Low-status subgroup members will be less likely to adhere to the norms presented in national polls compared to high-status group members	Hypothesis 4: Adherence to norms will depend on identification and perceived representation	Hypothesis 5: Subgroups will be less likely to follow superordinate group norms when the issue is particularly relevant to their group's interests	Did bandwagoning occur?
Study 1	no	yes	no	yes	n/a	Yes
Study 2A	no	yes	no – except Black Americans	no	n/a	Yes
Study 2B	no	yes	no – except Asian Americans (trend)	no	n/a	Yes
Study 3 Issue 1	no	manipulated (f = .42)	no	no	Yes	Yes
Study 3 Issue 2	no	manipulated (f = .60)	no	yes, but in opposite pattern than expected		Yes

Table 2.
Means of dependent variables within condition and race in Study 1.

	Poll Condition × Race Interaction (*f*)	White Participants		Black Participants	
		Pro	Con	Pro	Con
N		32	31	34	35
Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.22*	2.53 (1.83)	2.42 (1.98)	3.94 (1.94)	2.20 (1.86)
Opinion of Apple	.12	4.50 (1.81)	4.58 (1.79)	4.68 (1.89)	5.60 (1.50)
Opinion of FBI	.05	3.53 (1.88)	3.29 (1.55)	4.38 (1.69)	3.77 (1.57)
Representation of Black Americans	.04	4.32 (1.53)	4.49 (1.69)	4.32 (1.53)	4.22 (1.70)
Representation of White Americans	.00	5.09 (1.38)	5.06 (1.29)	5.15 (1.46)	5.20 (1.62)
American Identification	.14	5.38 (1.35)	4.55 (1.51)	5.26 (1.50)	5.24 (1.65)
Racial Identification	.16•	4.90 (1.64)	4.58 (1.62)	5.71 (1.26)	6.29 (1.05)
Prior Knowledge	.04	3.13 (1.54)	3.19 (1.62)	3.62 (1.69)	3.40 (1.96)
Perceived Poll Influence	.21*	1.84 (1.25)	3.21 (2.29)	2.48 (1.73)	2.34 (1.75)

Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; Pro = Majority Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; Con = Majority Do Not Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone
*•p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 3.
Correlations in Study 1, overall and within condition

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Overall	1. Participant Race (1 = White; 2 = Black)	–									
	2. Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.15	–								
	3. Opinion of Apple	.17	-.27**	–							
	4. Opinion of FBI	.19*	.33***	.06	–						
	5. Representation of Black Americans	.08	.06	.04	.09	–					
	6. Representation of White Americans	.03	.00	.25**	.08	.48***	–				
	7. American Identification	.09	.14	.11	.40***	.19*	.20*	–			
	8. Racial Identification	.41***	.10	.13	.23**	.18*	.05	.50***	–		
	9. Prior Knowledge	.10	.19*	-.04	.07	-.04	-.01	-.09	-.05	–	
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.17	.29**	-.04	.21*	.06	.15	.02	.01	.28**	–
	11. Bandwagoning	.21*	.02	-.03	.15	.36***	.13	.04	.08	.19*	.15
Pro	1. Participant Race	–									
	2. Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.36**	–								
	3. Opinion of Apple	.05	-.26*	–							
	4. Opinion of FBI	.24	.43***	-.04	–						
	5. Representation of Black Americans	.03	.40**	-.02	.16	–					
	6. Representation of White Americans	.02	.13	.29*	.09	.48***	–				
	7. American Identification	-.04	.16	.19	.31*	.30*	.40**	–			
	8. Racial Identification	.27*	.20	.05	.15	.24	.14	.51***	–		
	9. Prior Knowledge	.15	.39**	.00	-.04	.01	.07	-.21	-.03	–	
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.35**	.41**	.00	.22	.11	.10	-.08	.00	.38**	–
	11. Bandwagoning	.36**	1.00***	-.26	.43***	.40**	.13	.16	.20	.39**	.41**
Con	1. Participant Race	–									
	2. Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	-.58	–								
	3. Opinion of Apple	.30*	-.23	–							
	4. Opinion of FBI	.15	.16	.22	–						
	5. Representation of Black Americans	.13	-.32**	.11	.01	–					
	6. Representation of White Americans	.05	-.14	.21	.08	.48***	–				
	7. American Identification	.22	.07	.08	.48***	.09	.03	–			
	8. Racial Identification	.54***	.03	.21	.33**	.13	-.04	.51***	–		
	9. Prior Knowledge	.06	-.01	-.08	.18	-.09	-.07	.01	-.07	–	
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	-.04	.14	-.08	.20	-.00	.20	.11	.03	.18	–
	11. Bandwagoning	.06	-1.00***	.23	-.16	.32**	.14	-.07	-.03	.01	-.14

*Note: Pro = Majority Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; Con = Majority Do Not Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 4.
Correlations in Study 1, within race

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Black Americans	1. Poll Condition (1 = Pro; 2 = Con)	–										
	2. Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.42***	–									
	3. Opinion of Apple	-.27*	-.36**	–								
	4. Opinion of FBI	.18	.37**	-.25*	–							
	5. Representation of Black Americans	-.05	.07	-.10	.12	–						
	6. Representation of White Americans	-.12	-.06	.06	.03	.55***	–					
	7. American Identification	.01	.16	.02	.42***	.11	.18	–				
	8. Racial Identification	-.25*	-.07	.23	.14	.01	.01	.24	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	.06	.11	-.06	.07	-.12	.01	-.09	-.18	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.21	.23	-.10	.19	.14	.17	.01	-.17	.27*	–	
	11. Bandwagoning	.15	.06	-.19	.26*	.37**	.23	.07	-.09	.15	.27*	–
White Americans	1. Poll Condition	–										
	2. Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.03	–									
	3. Opinion of Apple	-.02	-.24	–								
	4. Opinion of FBI	.07	.24	.31*	–							
	5. Representation of Black Americans	.04	.01	.18	.03	–						
	6. Representation of White Americans	.01	.06	.49***	.13	.37**	–					
	7. American Identification	.28*	.09	.18	.36**	.27*	.22	–				
	8. Racial Identification	.10	.15	-.05	.19	.31*	.06	.75***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	-.02	.26*	-.07	.04	.05	-.05	-.11	-.05	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	-.21	.34**	-.03	.20	-.11	.10	-.01	.05	.27	–	
	11. Bandwagoning	-.16	-.09	.07	-.03	.33**	-.05	-.05	.07	.20	-.08	–

*Note: Pro = Majority Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; Con = Majority Do Not Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 5.
Effect sizes (Cohen's d) for pairwise comparisons, Study 1

	Poll Condition × Race Interaction (*f*)	Pro Vs. Con			White Participants Vs. Black Participants		
		White Participants	Black Participants	z	Pro	Con	z
Support for Apple Assisting the FBI	.22*	.06	.92***	-2.33*	.75**	.11	1.75
Opinion of Apple	.12	.04	.54*	-.38	.10	.62*	-1.43
Opinion of FBI	.05	.14	.37	-.64	.48	.31	.47
Representation of Black Americans	.04	.08	.10	-.06	.06	.27	-.59
Representation of White Americans	.00	.02	.03	-.03	.04	.10	-.17
American Identification	.14	.58*	.02	1.55	.08	.44	-1.00
Racial Identification	.16˙	.20	.55*	-.96	.50	1.25***	-1.92
Prior Knowledge	.04	.04	.12	-.22	.30	.12	.50
Perceived Poll Influence	.21*	.42	.43*	-.03	.74**	.08	1.81

Note: Pro = Majority Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone; Con = Majority Do Not Support Apple Assisting FBI in Unlocking the iPhone
*˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 6.
Means of dependent variables within condition and race in Study 2A.

	Poll Condition × Race Interaction (*f*)	White Participants		Black Participants		Latino/a Participants		Asian Participants	
		Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con
N		27	26	25	33	28	29	29	32
Opposition to Increasing SS Age	.18˙	3.54 (2.08)	4.50 (1.66)	4.32 (1.91)	4.58 (1.56)	4.00 (1.72)	5.00 (1.73)	2.82 (1.74)	4.75 (1.27)
Opinion of SS	.14	5.19 (1.90)	4.77 (1.45)	5.48 (1.69)	4.94 (1.46)	4.39 (1.69)	5.00 (1.95)	4.96 (1.80)	4.56 (2.00)
Representation of White Americans	.08	4.81 (1.60)	5.15 (1.35)	3.85 (1.69)	4.62 (1.65)	6.00 (0.82)	5.66 (1.29)	5.36 (1.39)	5.25 (1.44)
Representation of Black Americans	.14	3.85 (1.69)	4.62 (1.65)	4.00 (1.89)	4.64 (1.83)	3.64 (1.62)	5.31 (1.65)	4.25 (1.24)	4.91 (1.38)
Representation of Latino/a Americans	.12	3.92 (1.72)	4.38 (1.58)	3.52 (1.98)	4.00 (2.00)	3.54 (1.50)	5.00 (1.81)	3.96 (1.35)	4.59 (1.39)
Representation of Asian Americans	.08	3.77 (1.73)	4.31 (1.72)	3.84 (1.82)	3.82 (1.88)	3.96 (1.60)	4.72 (2.00)	3.68 (1.39)	4.25 (1.67)
American Identification	.19*	5.23 (1.40)	5.00 (1.93)	5.56 (1.92)	5.32 (1.37)	5.00 (1.65)	6.06 (1.22)	5.76 (0.87)	5.54 (1.19)
Racial Identification	.27*	4.99 (1.54)	4.83 (1.79)	6.24 (1.07)	5.92 (1.26)	5.40 (1.38)	6.43 (0.98)	6.07 (0.96)	5.65 (1.39)
Prior Knowledge	.21*	4.04 (1.56)	4.23 (1.66)	4.04 (1.62)	4.21 (1.54)	4.68 (1.66)	3.93 (1.75)	4.36 (1.50)	5.41 (1.32)
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	2.31 (1.46)	2.85 (1.78)	2.36 (1.87)	3.21 (2.07)	2.32 (1.39)	2.83 (2.09)	3.32 (1.93)	3.06 (1.88)
Willingness to Share Opinion	.11	5.38 (1.75)	5.31 (1.49)	5.76 (1.62)	5.30 (1.49)	5.18 (1.68)	5.69 (1.76)	5.29 (1.18)	5.20 (1.53)

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; Pro = Majority Support Increasing SS Age; Con = Majority Oppose Increasing SS Age; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 7. Correlations in Study 2A, overall and within condition

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Overall	1. Opposition to Increasing SS Age	–										
	2. Opinion of SS	.04	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	.06	.04	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	.04	.11	.29***	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	.13*	.11	.30***	.81***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	.12	.08	.28***	.68***	.81***	–					
	7. American Identification	-.05	.04	.07	.15*	.13	.09	–				
	8. Racial Identification	.08	.12	.13	.11	.09	.07	.65***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	.09	-.12	-.06	-.14*	-.15*	-.17*	-.15*	-.20**	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	-.11	.09	.03	.11	.11	.11	.03	.06*	.01	–	
	11. Willingness to Share Opinion	-.02	.25***	.07	-.02	.05	.02	.17*	.25***	-.19**	-.05	–
	12. Bandwagoning	-.05	.15*	.10	.19**	.19**	.20**	.10	.14*	-.05	.22**	.16*
Pro	1. Opposition to Increasing SS Age	–										
	2. Opinion of SS	-.08	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	-.01	-.05	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	-.23*	.18	.06	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	-.11	.13	.11	.79***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	-.11	.08	.12	.61***	.73***	–					
	7. American Identification	-.06	.12	-.01	.07	.06	.04	–				
	8. Racial Identification	-.06	.18	.04	.03	-.04	.02	.60***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	.14	-.10	.04	-.18	-.16	-.22*	-.05	-.03	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	-.39***	-.01	-.13	.13	.02	.08	.03	.11	.09	–	
	11. Willingness to Share Opinion	-.17	.28**	.00	-.06	-.13	-.13	.07	.13	-.12	-.16	–
	12. Bandwagoning	-1.00***	.08	.01	.23*	.11	.11	.16	.06	-.14	.39***	.17
Con	1. Opposition to Increasing SS Age	–										
	2. Opinion of SS	.22*	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	.17	.11	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	.16	.09	.51***	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	.27**	.13	.48***	.80***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	.28**	.10	.41***	.73***	.86***	–					
	7. American Identification	.05	-.04	.13	.22*	.18	.12	–				
	8. Racial Identification	.21*	.06	.20*	.17	.18	.11	.69***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	.02	-.12	-.13	-.15	-.17	-.15	-.24*	-.32***	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.09	.18	.16	.04	.15	.11	.08	.19*	-.07	–	
	11. Willingness to Share Opinion	.15	.24*	.13	.01	.20*	.13	.26**	.34***	-.25**	.04	–
	12. Bandwagoning	1.00***	.22*	.17	.16	.27**	.28**	.05	.21*	.02	.09	.15

Note: Pro = Majority Support Increasing SS Age; Con = Majority Oppose Increasing SS Age; •$p < .10$,*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$

Table 8.
Correlations in Study 2A, within race

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
White Americans	1. Poll Condition (1 = Pro; 2 = Con)	–											
	2. Oppose Increasing SS Age	.25	–										
	3. Opinion of SS	-.13	.04	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	.12	-.19	.07	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.23	.04	.21	.15**	–							
	6.Represent Latino/a Americans	.14	.00	.14	.43**	.94***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	.16	.08	.16	.43**	.92***	.91***	–					
	8. American Identification	-.07	-.11	.08	-.04	.00	.07	-.05	–				
	9. Racial Identification	-.05	-.10	.08	.07	.00	.05	-.03	.84***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.06	.01	-.09	-.16	-.11	-.11	-.12	-.23	-.35*	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.17	-.06	-.09	.03	-.08	-.06	.03	.22	.29*	.00	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	-.02	-.24	.34*	.15	.01	.00	-.08	.29*	.29*	-.11	.08	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.09	-.14	-.07	.20	.10	.07	.17	.04	-.04	.17	.39**	.08
Black Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Oppose Increasing SS Age	.08	–										
	3. Opinion of SS	-.17	-.03	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	-.05	.03	.03	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.17	-.21	.23	.18	–							
	6.Represent Latino/a Americans	.12	.00	.27*	.29*	.74***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	-.01	-.04	.23	.29*	.66***	.86***	–					
	8. American Identification	-.07	.03	.18	.12	.23	.10	.19	–				
	9. Racial Identification	-.14	.35**	.30*	.03	.25	.21	.26	.45**	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.06	.26*	-.33*	-.17	-.43**	-.35**	-.26*	-.11	-.10	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.21	-.07	.21	.03	.25	.23	.19	.09	.15	-.05	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	-.15	.00	.22	.18	.05	.10	.04	.08	.20	-.25	-.12	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.13	.06	.22	.02	.24	.26	.15	.06	.23	-.23	.11	.38**
Latino/a Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Oppose Increasing SS Age	.28*	–										
	3. Opinion of SS	.17	.20	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	-.16	.23	.04	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.46***	.16	.08	.17	–							
	6.Represent Latino/a Americans	.41**	.27*	.10	.11	.77***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	.21	.10	-.05	.18	.62***	.78***	–					
	8. American Identification	.35**	-.08	.04	-.07	.16	.15	.00	–				
	9. Racial Identification	.40**	.11	.07	.09	.09	.13	.11	.66***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.22	.07	.20	.07	-.03	-.09	-.25	-.31*	.40**	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.14	-.06	-.06	.19	.18	.23	.30*	.02	.09	.03	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	.15	.10	.27*	-.09	-.09	.16	.08	.13	.28*	-.27*	-.14	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.18	.18	.11	.08	.08	.23	.29*	.22	.26	-.20	.27*	.10
Asian Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Oppose Increasing SS Age	.54***	–										
	3. Opinion of SS	-.11	-.06	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	-.04	.18	.10	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.25	.24	-.03	.42**	–							
	6. Represet Latino/a Americans	.23	.35**	.00	.38**	.84***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	.19	.34**	.07	.16	.54***	.67***	–					
	8. American Identification	-.11	-.01	-.15	.19	.20	.23	.25	–				
	9. Racial Identification	-.18	-.04	.11	.25	.08	.02	-.01	.62***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.36**	.14	-.25	.04	-.04	-.07	-.05	.03	-.02	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.07	-.19	.24	.02	-.04	-.03	-.08	-.17	.06	-.04	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	-.05	.01	.19	.00	-.17	-.08	.01	.21	.25	-.07	.03	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.23	-.24	.41**	.09	.14	.13	.19	.05	.24	-.05	.10	.13

*Note: Pro = Majority Support Increasing SS Age; Con = Majority Oppose Increasing SS Age; ˙p < .10,*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 9.
Effect size (Cohen's d) comparisons within condition and race in Study 2A.

	Poll × Race Interaction (f)	Pro vs. Con				Pro						Con					
						B vs.			L vs.		A vs.	B vs.			L vs.		A vs.
		W	B	L	A	W	L	A	W	A	W	W	L	A	W	A	W
Opposition to Increasing SS Age	.18˙	.51*	.15	.58*	1.27***	.39	.18	.82**	.24	.68*	.37	.05	.25	.12	.30	.16	.17
Opinion of SS	.14	.25	.34	.34	.21	.16	.65*	.30	.45˙	.02	.12	.12	.03	.22	.13	.22	.12
Representation of White Americans	.08	.23	.10	.32	.08	.25	.64*	.11	.94**	.56˙	.37	.07	.39˙	.13	.39	.30	.07
Representation of Black Americans	.14	.46˙	.34	1.02***	.50	.08	.20	.16	.13	.42	.27	.01	.38	.17	.42	.26	.19
Representation of Latino/a Americans	.12	.28	.24	.88	.46	.22	.01	.26	.24	.29	.03	.21	.52*	.34	.36	.25	.14
Representation of Asian Americans	.08	.31	.01	.42**	.37	.04	.07	.10	.11	.19	.06	.27	.46*	.24	.22	.26	.04
American Identification	.19*	.14	.14	.73**	.21	.19	.31	.14	.15	.58˙	.45	.19	.56˙	.17	.66**	.43	.34
Racial Identification	.27*	.09	.27	.86**	.36	.94**	.68*	.16	.28	.57˙	.84**	.70**	.45	.20	1.10***	.65*	.51*
Prior Knowledge	.21*	.12	.11	.44	.75**	.00	.39	.21	.40	.20	.21	.01	.17	.84**	.18	.96***	.79**
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	.33	.43˙	.29	.14	.03	.02	.51˙	.01	.60*	.59*	.19	.18	.08	.01	.12	.11
Willingness to Share Opinion	.11	.04	.30	.30	.11	.23	.35	.33	.12	.08	.06	.01	.24	.10	.23	.32	.11

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses; Pro = Majority Support Increasing SS Age; Con = Majority Oppose Increasing SS Age; W = White Participants, B = Black Participants, L = Latino/a Participants, A = Asian Participants; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 10.

Means of dependent variables within condition and race in Study 2B.

	Poll Condition × Race Interaction (*f*)	White Participants		Black Participants		Latino/a Participants		Asian Participants	
		Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con
N		29	26	29	30	30	29	27	29
Opposition to Free Trade in NA	.13	3.00 (1.56)	4.15 (1.49)	2.45 (1.64)	3.97 (1.56)	2.27 (1.29)	3.79 (1.86)	2.37 (1.45)	2.93 (1.75)
Opinion of Free Trade	.12	4.59 (1.88)	3.27 (1.85)	5.24 (1.75)	3.90 (1.58)	5.23 (1.76)	3.59 (2.08)	5.41 (1.60)	4.93 (1.83)
Representation of White Americans	.00	5.03 (1.18)	5.08 (1.55)	5.10 (1.67)	5.23 (1.70)	5.63 (1.47)	5.69 (1.34)	5.26 (1.46)	5.38 (1.24)
Representation of Black Americans	.06	4.31 (1.37)	4.38 (1.60)	4.31 (1.65)	4.00 (1.78)	4.63 (1.75)	4.55 (1.86)	4.37 (1.47)	4.62 (1.40)
Representation of Latino/a Americans	.16	4.31 (1.54)	4.27 (1.59)	4.38 (1.76)	3.47 (1.70)	4.57 (1.89)	4.41 (1.92)	3.93 (1.59)	4.45 (1.38)
Representation of Asian Americans	.13	4.34 (1.57)	4.27 (1.69)	4.38 (1.70)	3.60 (1.69)	4.50 (1.82)	4.66 (1.95)	3.81 (1.80)	4.21 (1.61)
American Identification	.09	5.09 (1.85)	5.06 (1.60)	5.31 (2.05)	5.33 (1.53)	5.40 (1.73)	5.80 (1.25)	5.84 (0.91)	5.47 (1.15)
Racial Identification	.10	4.89 (1.92)	4.95 (1.41)	6.06 (1.44)	5.93 (1.29)	5.80 (1.44)	6.23 (1.00)	6.06 (1.12)	5.75 (1.24)
Prior Knowledge	.10	3.17 (1.61)	3.23 (1.53)	3.10 (1.76)	4.00 (1.72)	2.93 (1.93)	3.03 (1.68)	3.44 (1.63)	3.68 (1.72)
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	2.55 (1.80)	2.23 (1.48)	2.79 (1.95)	2.97 (1.88)	2.87 (1.13)	3.00 (2.09)	3.04 (1.99)	2.59 (1.92)
Willingness to Share Opinion	.10	5.34 (1.50)	5.23 (1.45)	5.45 (1.62)	5.47 (1.53)	5.17 (1.82)	5.69 (1.47)	5.41 (1.45)	5.27 (1.58)

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pro = Majority Support Free Trade; Con = Majority Oppose Free Trade; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 11. Correlations in Study 2B, overall and within condition

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Overall	1. Opposing Free Trade in NA	–										
	2. Opinion of Free Trade	-.89***	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	-.08	.04	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	-.01	.04	.51***	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	-.07	.08	.42***	.77***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	-.04	.05	.42***	.72***	.84***	–					
	7. American Identification	-.03	.09	.03	.18**	.18**	.16*	–				
	8. Racial Identification	-.03	.08	.10	.11	.11	.11	.67***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	-.08	.09	-.06	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.10	-.14*	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.01	.04	-.01	.17*	.17*	.15*	.06	.06	.06	–	
	11. Willing to Share Opinion	-.17*	.19**	.08	.02	.02	.01	.11	.18**	-.30***	-.12	–
	12. Bandwagoning	-.01	-.05	-.07	-.01	-.01	.03	.00	-.07	-.02	-.03	-.02
Pro	1. Opposing Free Trade in NA	–										
	2. Opinion of Free Trade	-.85***	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	-.13	.09	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	-.17	.19*	.54***	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	-.29**	.32**	.49***	.82***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	-.24*	.25**	.45***	.75***	.84***	–					
	7. American Identification	-.16	.21*	.02	.08	.11	.08	–				
	8. Racial Identification	-.26**	.29**	.12	.14	.13	.10	.73***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	-.07	.01	-.10	-.11	-.02	-.10	-.16	-.19*	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	-.30**	.33***	-.02	.15	.22*	.21*	.06	.00	.10	–	
	11. Willing to Share Opinion	-.29**	.28**	.12	.12	.11	.09	.20*	.24**	-.36***	.04	–
	12. Bandwagoning	-.15	.08	-.19	-.19*	-.17	-.18	-.11	-.15	.19*	-.04	-.07
Con	1. Opposing to Free Trade in NA	–										
	2. Opinion of Free Trade	-.90***	–									
	3. Representation of White Americans	-.07	.02	–								
	4. Representation of Black Americans	.11	-.09	.47***	–							
	5. Representation of Latino/a Americans	.16	-.16	.36***	.73***	–						
	6. Representation of Asian Americans	.14	-.14	.40***	.69***	.83***	–					
	7. American Identification	.10	-.05	.04	.30**	.28**	.25**	–				
	8. Racial Identification	.19*	-.14	.08	.11	.08	.13	.57***	–			
	9. Prior Knowledge	-.19*	.24**	-.03	-.10	-.05	-.02	-.02	-.08	–		
	10. Perceived Poll Influence	.33***	-.27**	.00	.13	.10	.09	.06	.14	.03	–	
	11. Willing to Share Opinion	-.10	.13	.03	-.16	-.07	-.07	.01	.09	-.24*	-.29**	–
	12. Bandwagoning	.04	-.11	.05	.06	.16	.24*	.13	.01	-.26**	-.01	.04

*Note: Pro = Majority Support Free Trade; Con = Majority Oppose Free Trade; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 12.
Correlations in Study 2B, within race

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
White Americans	1. Poll Condition (1 = Pro; 2 = Con)	–											
	2. Opposing Free Trade in NA	.36**	–										
	3. Opinion of Free Trade	-.34*	-.93***	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	.02	-.25	.26	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.03	-.14	.10	.73***	–							
	6. Represent Latino/a Americans	-.01	-.08	.07	.68***	.89***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	-.02	-.09	.04	.64***	.87***	.83***	–					
	8. American Identification	-.01	.15	-.14	-.07	.11	.17	.12	–				
	9. Racial Identification	.02	.12	-.13	.02	.12	.16	.09	.85***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.02	-.22	.31*	-.01	-.14	-.16	-.17	-.05	-.05	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.10	-.28*	.31*	-.04	-.05	-.08	-.01	.03	.11	.57***	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	-.04	-.14	.13	.10	.11	.13	.04	-.02	-.02	-.08	-.13	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.06	-.18	.12	-.18	-.10	-.11	-.08	-.07	-.07	.08	.09	-.10
Black Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Opposing Free Trade in NA	.43**	–										
	3. Opinion of Free Trade	-.38**	-.81***	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	.04	-.10	-.02	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	-.09	-.02	.08	.53***	–							
	6. Represent Latino/a Americans	-.26*	-.13	.18	.32*	.75***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	-.23	-.06	.12	.41**	.85***	.86***	–					
	8. American Identification	.01	-.16	.31*	.07	.29*	.25	.24	–				
	9. Racial Identification	-.05	.01	.06	.07	.25	.17	.28*	.51***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.25	.14	-.11	-.15	-.18	-.04	-.06	.02	-.05	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.05	.07	-.12	-.06	.15	.09	.12	.17	.16	-.17	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	.01	-.29*	.23	.14	.07	.10	.05	.07	.16	-.07	-.13	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.04	-.14	.10	-.24	-.15	-.10	-.06	-.08	-.11	.06	.13	-.06
Latino/a Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Opposing Free Trade in NA	.44**	–										
	3. Opinion of Free Trade	-.40**	-.92***	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	.02	.07	-.06	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	-.02	-.01	.06	.29*	–							
	6. Represent Latino/a Americans	-.04	-.04	.08	.33*	.69***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	.04	-.05	.09	.33*	.59***	.87***	–					
	8. American Identification	.13	-.06	.08	.02	.14	.12	.08	–				
	9. Racial Identification	.17	-.08	.14	.24	.11	.16	.14	.69***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.03	-.22	.11	-.03	-.09	-.02	.04	-.26*	-.30*	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.03	.15	-.06	-.02	.22	.30*	.24	.01	-.03	-.11	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	.16	-.09	.15	.09	-.16	-.08	-.02	.25	.34**	-.45***	-.12	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.45***	.12	-.12	.00	-.06	.11	.19	.14	.14	.02	-.07	.07
Asian Americans	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Opposing Free Trade in NA	.17	–										
	3. Opinion of Free Trade	-.14	-.90***	–									
	4. Represent White Americans	.05	.00	-.02	–								
	5. Represent Black Americans	.09	.17	-.14	.52***	–							
	6. Represent Latino/a Americans	.18	-.02	.02	.42**	.81***	–						
	7. Represent Asian Americans	.12	-.01	.02	.33*	.60***	.78***	–					
	8. American Identification	-.18	.13	-.04	.00	.08	.17	.26	–				
	9. Racial Identification	-.13	-.04	.13	-.03	.02	-.06	-.02	.60***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.13	-.01	-.04	.03	.05	.11	.00	-.17	-.28*	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.23	.02	.07	.02	.20	.29*	.20	-.07	-.15	.15	–	
	12. Willing to Share Opinion	-.09	-.19	.29*	-.04	-.05	-.04	-.04	.19	.27*	-.55***	-.11	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.03	.11	-.22	.14	..03	-.04	-.03	-.05	-.15	-.18	-.21	.02

*Note: Pro = Majority Support Free Trade; Con = Majority Oppose Free Trade; ˙p < .10,*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 13.
Effect size (Cohen's d) comparisons within condition and race in Study 2B.

	Poll × Race Interaction (f)	Pro vs. Con				Pro						Con					
						B vs.			L vs.		A vs.	B vs.			L vs.		A vs.
		W	B	L	A	W	L	A	W	A	W	W	L	A	W	A	W
Opposition to Free Trade in NA	.13	.75**	.95***	.95***	.35	.34	.12	.05	.51•	.07	.42	.12	.10	.63*	.21	.48*	.75**
Opinion of Free Trade	.12	.71**	.80**	.85**	.28	.36	.01	.10	.35	.11	.47•	.37	.17	.60*	.16	.68**	.90**
Representation of White Americans	.00	.04	.08	.04	.09	.05	.35	.11	.45	.25	.17	.09	.30	.10	.42	.24	.21
Representation of Black Americans	.06	.05	.18	.04	.17	.00	.19	.04	.20	.16	.04	.22	.30	.39	.10	.04	.16
Representation of Latino/a Americans	.16	.03	.53*	.08	.35	.04	.10	.27	.15	.37	.24	.49•	.52*	.63*	.08	.02	.12
Representation of Asian Americans	.13	.04	.46•	.08	.23	.02	.07	.33	.09	.38	.31	.40	.58*	.37	.23	.27	.04
American Identification	.09	.02	.01	.26	.36	.11	.05	.33	.17	.32	.51•	.17	.33	.10	.51•	.27	.29
Racial Identification	.10	.04	.09	.34	.27	.69**	.18	.00	.54*	.20	.75**	.73**	.25	.15	1.05**	.43	.60*
Prior Knowledge	.10	.04	.52*	.06	.27	.04	.09	.20	.14	.29	.17	.47•	.57*	.06	.12	.50•	.40
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	.19	.02	.06	.46•	.13	.04	.13	.16	.08	.26	.44	.02	.43	.43	.43	.04
Willingness to Share Opinion	.10	.07	.01	.31	.17	.07	.16	.03	.10	.15	.05	.16	.15	.20	.32	.35	.06

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses;Pro = Majority Support Free Trade; Con = Majority Oppose Free Trade; W = White Participants, B = Black Participants, L = Latino/a Participants, A = Asian Participants; •p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 14.

Means of dependent variables within condition and race in Study 3 Issue 1.

		Men				Women			
	Poll Condition × Gender Representation × Gender (*f*)	**Women Majority**		**Women Minority**		**Women Majority**		**Women Minority**	
		Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro
N		32	26	33	24	20	22	17	24
Support for Discount Cards	.04	2.81 (1.91)	3.35 (1.72)	2.76 (1.86)	3.96 (1.82)	2.70 (1.92)	5.09 (1.15)	1.88 (1.54)	3.96 (1.92)
Representation of Men	.04	3.81 (1.71)	3.69 (1.19)	4.58 (1.37)	5.17 (1.49)	4.05 (1.57)	3.64 (1.68)	5.06 (1.56)	5.04 (1.46)
Representation of Women	.14˙	4.63 (1.81)	5.19 (1.20)	4.00 (1.54)	4.21 (1.53)	5.90 (.97)	4.95 (1.70)	3.88 (1.69)	4.13 (1.54)
Relevance of the Poll to Men	.00	4.19 (1.45)	3.54 (1.42)	3.73 (1.57)	3.58 (1.14)	4.05 (1.36)	3.14 (1.25)	4.06 (1.68)	4.04 (1.43)
Relevance of the Poll to Women	.03	4.56 (1.37)	4.54 (1.24)	4.73 (1.21)	4.75 (1.15)	5.65 (.75)	5.09 (.81)	5.00 (1.17)	4.75 (1.29)
American Identification	.04	5.46 (1.66)	4.95 (1.55)	5.78 (1.32)	5.50 (1.43)	5.27 (1.57)	5.70 (1.72)	5.82 (1.41)	5.38 (1.52)
Gender Identification	.07	5.82 (1.56)	5.78 (1.09)	6.06 (1.01)	6.03 (1.03)	6.21 (1.11)	5.98 (1.75)	6.12 (1.09)	6.21 (.99)
Prior Knowledge	.04	2.69 (1.91)	3.38 (1.90)	2.85 (1.64)	3.08 (2.04)	2.85 (2.08)	2.09 (1.63)	2.53 (2.04)	2.50 (1.47)
Perceived Poll Influence	.10	3.25 (1.97)	2.46 (1.56)	2.61 (1.48)	2.87 (1.57)	3.10 (1.97)	3.05 (1.59)	3.24 (1.92)	2.67 (1.31)
Importance of the Issue	.09	2.66 (1.68)	3.27 (1.76)	3.30 (1.63)	3.08 (1.56)	3.75 (1.55)	2.77 (1.51)	3.76 (1.52)	3.29 (1.20)

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Con = Majority Policy Unacceptable; Pro = Majority Policy Acceptable; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 15. Correlations in Study 3, overall and within poll condition, Issue 1

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Overall	1. Participant Gender (1 = Male; 2 = Female)	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.00	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	.09	.06	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.05	-.35***	-.05	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.07	.32***	-.02	-.12	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.01	-.02	-.23**	.23**	-.09	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.19**	.04	-.06	-.01	.38***	-.10	–					
	8. American Identification	.03	-.09	.09	.03	.03	-.07	.06	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.08	-.07	.13	.02	.02	-.14	.09	.65***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.13	.00	-.18*	-.02	-.02	.15*	-.06	-.17*	-.14	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.05	.05	-.08	-.11	.00	.06	.02	.13	.10	.04	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.09	-.08	-.40	.02	-.03	.30***	.09	-.04	-.08	.37***	.25***	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.17*	-.02	-.04	.02	-.02	.00	.11	.00	-.01	-.05	.16*	.12
Pro	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	-.04	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	.23*	.04	–									
	4. Representation of Men	-.01	-.45***	-.05	–								
	5. Representation of Women	-.06	.30**	-.06	-.19	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.02	-.17	-.21*	.25*	-.15	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.12	.02	.08	-.01	.22*	-.38***	–					
	8. American Identification	.10	-.05	.13	.09	.17	-.08	.14	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.08	-.10	.13	.20	.12	-.01	.10	.68***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.26*	.00	-.26*	.08	.07	.21*	-.16	-.05	-.09	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.06	-.01	.13	-.15	.10	-..03	.07	.21	.14	.06	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	-.05	-.05	-.31**	.00	.07	.34**	-.03	.07	.06	.38***	.11	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.23*	.04	1.00***	-.05	-.06	-.21*	.08	.13	.13	-.26*	.13	-.31**
Con	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.05	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	-.12	.08	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.10	-.26**	-.08	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.19	.34***	-.01	-.06	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.03	.10	-.18	.23*	-.04	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.28**	.07	-.15	.00	.52***	.10	–					
	8. American Identification	-.03	-.14	.12	-.04	-.09	-.08	-.02	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.09	-.04	.15	-.15	-.07	-.25*	.07	.61***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.02	.00	-.14	-.12	-.10	.11	.03	-.27**	-.17	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.06	.10	-.18	-.07	-.07	.10	-.02	.05	.07	.04	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.23*	-.12	-.50***	.04	-.10	.26**	.19	-.14	-.19	.37***	.35***	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.12	-.08	-1.00	.08	.01	.18	.15	-.12	-.15	.14	.18	.50***

*Note: Con = Majority Policy Unacceptable; Pro = Majority Policy Acceptable; *p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 16.
Correlations in Study 3, within participant gender, Issue 1

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Men	1. Poll Condition (1 = Con, 2 = Pro)	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.03	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	.24*	-.07	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.06	-.34***	.02	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.13	.25**	-.01	-.15	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.14	.08	-.27**	.17	-.08	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.00	-.08	.02	.01	.32**	-.04	–					
	8. American Identification	-.14	-.14	.13	-.07	-.03	-.16	.09	–				
	9. Gender Identification	-.02	-.10	.23*	-.10	.03	-.29**	.09	.72***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.13	.01	-.14	.04	-.07	.20*	-.13	-.18	-.17	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.08	.05	-.07	-.10	-.03	.02	-.02	.13	.06	.10	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.06	-.09	-.39***	.05	-.10	.40***	.05	-.16	-.19*	.35***	.26**	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.06	-.10	-.17	.14	-.07	.10	.19*	-.12	-.09	.01	.14	.05
Women	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	-.06	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	.54***	.21	–									
	4. Representation of Men	-.04	-.37**	-.14	–								
	5. Representation of Women	-.14	.42***	-.05	-.09	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.15	-.17	-.18	.31**	-.10	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	-.21	.24*	-.23*	-.07	.47***	-.20	–					
	8. American Identification	.00	-.02	.03	.14	.10	.06	.00	–				
	9. Gender Identification	-.03	-.03	-.01	.16	-.01	.06	.04	.55***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.11	-.02	-.21	-.09	.07	.07	.13	-.14	-.06	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.09	.05	-.10	-.11	.02	.10	.06	.13	.14	-.01	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	-.25*	-.09	-.45***	-.03	.06	.15	.12	.15	.07	.45***	.24*	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.04	.08	.08	-.17	.02	-.14	-.10	.16	.05	-.09	.16	.20

*Note: Con = Majority Policy Unacceptable; Pro = Majority Policy Acceptable; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 17.
Correlations in Study 3, within gender majority condition, Issue 1

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Women Majority	1. Participant Gender (1 = Male; 2 = Female)	–											
	2. Poll Condition	.08	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	.23*	.36***	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.02	-.08	-.13	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.17	-.01	-.15	.15	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.11	-.28**	-.18	.28**	.12	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.34**	-.08	.02	.09	.40***	-.03	–					
	8. American Identification	.08	-.03	.12	-.09	-.01	-.09	-.01	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.10	-.04	.13	-.03	.04	-.14	.07	.72***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.14	.01	-.27**	-.07	.02	.29**	-.09	-.07	-.13	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.05	-.13	.00	-.11	-.10	-.13	.06	.26**	.21*	.04	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.09	-.01	-.41***	.02	.04	.30**	.01	.01	-.07	.52***	.22*	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.26**	.06	.09	.06	.03	-.21*	.10	-.04	-.06	-.01	.10	.06
Women Minority	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Poll Condition	.16	–										
	3. Support for Discount Cards	-.05	.39***	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.08	.13	.07	–								
	5. Representation of Women	-.02	.07	.06	-.16	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.13	-.01	-.28**	.19	-.29**	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.05	-.03	-.15	-.09	.38***	-.16	–					
	8. American Identification	-.04	-.13	.07	.10	.15	-.05	.15	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.06	.02	.15	.02	.04	-.15	.11	.52***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.12	.02	-.08	.03	-.07	.00	-.02	-.29**	-.15	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.06	-.02	-.18	-.08	.07	.27**	-.02	-.04	-.07	.05	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.09	-.09	-.39***	-.05	-.05	.30**	.19	-.12	-.10	20*	.30**	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.09	-.06	.01	-.04	-.05	.21*	.13	.04	.04	-.11	.23*	.19

Note: $^{\cdot}p < .10, ^{*}p < .05, ^{**}p < .01, ^{***}p < .001$

Table 18.
Effect size (Cohen's d) comparisons within conditions Study 3 Issue 1.

	Poll Condition × Gender Representation × Gender (*f*)	Poll Condition × Gender			Gender Representation × Gender			Poll Condition × Gender Representation		
		Women Majority	Women Minority	z	Pro	Con	z	Men	Women	z
Support for Discount Cards	.04	.23	.12	.38	.19	.09	.35	.06	.00	.20
Representation of Men	.04	.00	.11	-.38	.05	.03	.07	.15	.04	.38
Representation of Women	.14˙	.24	.00	.83	.06	.24	-.62	.05	.20	-.51
Relevance of the Poll to Men	.00	.00	.03	-.10	.11	.07	.14	.11	.13	-.07
Relevance of the Poll to Women	.03	.10	.04	.21	.10	.18	-.28	.00	.07	-.24
American Identification	.04	.04	.04	.00	.10	.00	.35	.04	.05	-.03
Gender Identification	.07	.13	.03	.35	.05	.08	-.10	.00	.09	-.31
Prior Knowledge	.04	.14	.04	.35	.00	.06	-.21	.04	.06	-.07
Perceived Poll Influence	.10	.03	.12	-.31	.07	.11	-.14	.14	.05	.31
Importance of the Issue	.09	.23	.03	.69	.05	.11	-.21	.11	.07	.14

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Con = Majority Policy Unacceptable; Pro = Majority Policy Acceptable; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 19.

Means of dependent variables within condition and race in Study 3 Issue 2.

		Men				Women			
	Poll Condition × Gender Representation × Gender (*f*)	**Women Majority**		**Women Minority**		**Women Majority**		**Women Minority**	
N		Con 25	Pro 33	Con 24	Pro 33	Con 25	Pro 17	Con 19	Pro 22
Support for Enacting More Laws	.12˙	3.24 (1.96)	3.88 (1.65)	3.33 (1.76)	3.38 (1.84)	4.08 (1.66)	4.29 (1.90)	4.53 (1.93)	5.59 (.59)
Representation of Men	.04	3.28 (1.34)	3.79 (1.41)	5.30 (1.21)	4.88 (1.30)	3.60 (1.68)	3.29 (1.65)	5.74 (1.05)	5.09 (1.31)
Representation of Women	.05	5.28 (1.62)	5.73 (1.23)	3.42 (1.56)	4.29 (1.83)	5.04 (1.14)	6.06 (1.35)	3.42 (1.77)	4.23 (1.54)
Relevance of the Poll to Men	.12˙	3.28 (1.40)	3.94 (1.17)	4.15 (1.72)	3.63 (1.28)	3.40 (1.12)	3.18 (1.07)	3.74 (1.66)	4.00 (1.63)
Relevance of the Poll to Women	.15*	5.68 (1.35)	6.21 (1.29)	5.94 (1.50)	6.29 (.91)	6.24 (.78)	6.29 (1.05)	5.05 (1.43)	6.09 (1.23)
American Identification	.08	5.28 (1.69)	5.19 (1.59)	5.52 (1.50)	5.86 (1.15)	5.64 (1.67)	5.27 (1.64)	5.35 (1.51)	5.74 (1.46)
Gender Identification	.07	2.88 (1.27)	5.75 (1.43)	6.06 (1.01)	6.03 (1.04)	5.96 (1.71)	6.29 (1.03)	5.86 (1.17)	6.44 (.81)
Prior Knowledge	.11	5.28 (1.77)	5.61 (1.64)	5.09 (2.01)	5.29 (1.49)	5.36 (1.29)	4.82 (2.07)	5.26 (1.66)	5.91 (1.51)
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	2.76 (1.81)	2.58 (1.58)	2.64 (1.67)	2.38 (1.38)	3.20 (1.85)	2.71 (1.69)	2.26 (1.59)	2.77 (1.80)
Importance of the Issue	.24**	3.76 (1.94)	4.45 (1.52)	4.61 (1.80)	3.87 (1.51)	5.64 (1.35)	4.76 (2.08)	5.37 (1.57)	6.14 (1.04)

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Con = Majority Current Laws; Pro = Majority More Laws; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 20. Correlations in Study 3, overall and within condition, Issue 2

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Overall	1. Participant Gender (1 = Male; 2 = Female)	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.00	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.31***	-.07	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.03	-.53***	.06	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.00	.48***	.00	-.33***	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.07	-.14*	-.01	.29***	-.07	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	-.04	.08	.27***	-.06	.16*	-.11	–					
	8. American Identification	.03	-.09	-.27***	-.04	.06	.11	-.03	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.08	-.07	-.13	-.07	-.06	-.01	.05	.65***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.02	-.01	.37***	.03	.04	.03	.41***	-.06	.02	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.05	.08	-.14	-.03	.08	.06	-.18*	.19**	.02	-.25**	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.37***	-.08	.53***	.14*	-.11	.23**	.18	-.10	.05	.48***	-.04	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.05	-.04	-.06	.06	.08	.08	.00	.21**	.20**	-.04	.03	-.08
Pro	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	-.14	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.38***	-.12	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.02	-.44***	.13	–								
	5. Representation of Women	-.03	.48***	.05	-.37***	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.06	-.05	.07	.19	-.16	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	-.03	.02	.28**	-.05	.24*	-.12	–					
	8. American Identification	.02	-.20	-.06	-.01	.04	.00	.06	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.22*	-.13	.08	-.01	.02	-.07	.13	.65***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.01	-.07	.34**	-.06	.15	-.04	.46***	.08	.14	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.08	.02	-.11	.07	.01	-.02	-.18	.14	-.03	-.24*	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.38***	-.12	.49***	.16	-.03	.27**	.10	-.08	.13	.43***	-.09	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.38***	-.12	1.00***	.13	.05	.07	.28**	-.06	.08	.34**	-.11	.49***
Con	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.14	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.26**	-.03	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.03	-.60***	.01	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.03	.50***	-.11	-.29**	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.08	-.22*	-.08	.36***	-.02	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	-.04	.13	.23*	-.06	.03	-.12	–					
	8. American Identification	.03	.00	-.45***	-.06	.08	.19	-.10	–				
	9. Gender Identification	-.03	-.03	-.31**	-.11	-.14	.04	-.02	.65***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.04	.05	.38***	.12	-.09	.08	.36***	-.18	-.08	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.03	.14	-.15	-.11	.16	.11	-.17	.22*	.06	-.24*	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.35***	-.05	.59***	.12	-.18	.20*	.25*	-.12	-.02	.52***	.00	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.26**	.03	-1.00***	-.01	.11	.08	-.23*	.45***	.31**	-.38***	.15	-.59***

*Note: Con = Majority Current Laws; Pro = Majority More Law; •p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 21.
Correlations in Study 3, within participant gender, gender-relevant issue

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Men	1. Poll Condition (1 = Con; 2 = Pro)	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	.15	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.11	.07	–									
	4. Representation of Men	-.06	-.51***	.00	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.25**	.49***	.07	-.29**	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.01	-.10	.04	.35***	-.17	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.16	-.04	.32***	.03	.21*	.01	–					
	8. American Identification	.02	-.14	-.32***	.03	.00	-.03	.05	–				
	9. Gender Identification	-.05	-.10	-.19*	-.04	.00	.00	.08	.72***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.09	.08	.31**	-.03	.05	.02	.42***	.02	.11	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.06	.04	-.17	.01	.02	.09	-.27**	.13	-.01	-.29**	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	-.01	-.04	.36***	.17	-.18	.50***	.12	-.11	.01	.38***	.02	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.27**	.04	-.06	.08	.04	.06	-.03	.16	.18	-.08	-.02	-.16
Women	1. Poll Condition	–											
	2. Gender Majority Condition	-.13	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.23*	-.28*	–									
	4. Representation of Men	-.06	-.55***	.12	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.20	.47***	-.11	-.38***	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	.03	-.20	-.04	.22*	.08	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.19	.27*	.25*	-.19	.08	-.32**	–					
	8. American Identification	.01	-.02	-.25*	-.13	.16	.30**	-.15	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.18	-.03	-.13	-.10	-.14	-.01	.02	.55***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.04	-.14	.50***	.11	.02	.05	.38***	-.18	-.10	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	-.02	.13	-.15	-.08	.15	.02	-.05	.26*	.04	-.18	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.01	-.16	.67***	.10	-.02	-.06	.35**	-.14	.02	.72***	-.18	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.39***	-.17	-.11	.02	.15	.12	.04	.27*	.23*	.02	.10	-.02

*Note: Con = Majority Current Laws; Pro = Majority More Laws; •p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 22.
Correlations in Study 3, within gender majority condition, gender-relevant issue

Condition		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Women Majority	1. Participant Gender (1 = Male; 2 = Female)	–											
	2. Poll Condition	-.16	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.16	.10	–									
	4. Representation of Men	-.03	.06	-.01	–								
	5. Representation of Women	-.03	.25*	.15	-.11	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.14	.14	-.11	.36***	-.11	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	.12	.12	.39***	-.05	.25*	-.13	–					
	8. American Identification	.08	-.07	-.23*	-.15	.05	-.12	.08	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.10	.01	-.19	-.19	.03	-.15	.07	.72***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	-.10	.01	.28**	-.19	.22*	-.07	.38***	-.02	-.02	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.10	-.11	-.13	.14	-.01	.10	-.22*	.24*	.04	-.30**	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.31**	-.04	.43***	-.02	.0	.19	.21*	-.11	-.06	.39***	.03	–
	13. Bandwagoning	-.05	-.07	-.04	-.04	.07	-.15	.06	.20*	.17	.00	-.03	-.24*
Women Minority	1. Participant Gender	–											
	2. Poll Condition	.11	–										
	3. Support for Enacting More Laws	.47***	.18	–									
	4. Representation of Men	.11	-.20	.07	–								
	5. Representation of Women	.02	.25*	-.06	-.09	–							
	6. Relevance of the Poll to Men	-.02	-.06	.05	.16	.07	–						
	7. Relevance of the Poll to Women	-.18	.22*	.19	.01	.05	-.09	–					
	8. American Identification	-.04	.13	-.33**	-.05	.20	.29**	-.13	–				
	9. Gender Identification	.06	.12	-.06	-.01	-.09	.12	.05	.52***	–			
	10. Prior Knowledge	.13	.13	.45***	.30**	-.09	.11	.43***	-.11	.08	–		
	11. Perceived Poll Influence	.00	.02	-.14	-.15	.09	.04	-.16	.14	.00	-.18	–	
	12. Importance of the Issue	.43***	.02	.64***	.28**	-.15	.26*	.17	-.11	.18	.57***	-.10	–
	13. Bandwagoning	.15	.08	-.08	.13	.15	.24*	-.06	.21*	.24*	-.07	.11	.07

*Note: Con = Majority Current Laws; Pro = Majority More Laws; †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*

Table 23.
Effect size (Cohen's d) comparisons within conditions Study 3 Issue 2

	Poll Condition × Gender Representation × Gender (*f*)	Poll Condition × Gender			Gender Representation × Gender			Poll Condition × Gender Representation		
		Women Majority	Women Minority	z	Pro	Con	z	Men	Women	z
Support for Enacting More Laws	.12	.11	.12	-.03	.32	.07	.86	.08	.17	-.31
Representation of Men	.04	.15	.06	.31	.10	.03	.24	.17	.07	.34
Representation of Women	.05	.13	.00	.45	.05	.03	.07	.06	.05	.03
Relevance of the Poll to Men	.12	.14	.11	.10	.15	.08	.24	.19	.05	.48
Relevance of the Poll to Women	.15	.12	.18	-.21	.04	.32	-.96	.08	.22	-.48
American Identification	.08	.06	.11	-.17	.05	.12	-.24	.00	.16	-.55
Gender Identification	.07	.00	.21	-.73	.07	.07	.00	.06	.08	-.07
Prior Knowledge	.11	.17	.06	.38	.24	.00	.83	.04	.18	-.48
Perceived Poll Influence	.11	.08	.11	-.10	.10	.11	-.03	.03	.19	-.55
Importance of the Issue	.24	.20	.26	-.21	.30	.15	.52	.20	.28	-.27

*Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Pro = Majority More Laws; Con = Majority Current Laws; ˙p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001*



Figure 1. Perceived Representation of Race by Participant Race in Study 1



Figure 2. Issue Support in Study 1



Figure 3. Racial Identification by Participant Race in Study 2A



Figure 4. Perceived Representation of Race by Participant Race in Study 2A



Figure 5. Perceived Representation of One's Own Race by Participant Race in Study 2A



Figure 6. Issue Support in Study 2A



Figure 7. Perceived Representation of Race by Participant Race in Study 2B



Figure 8. Perceived Representation of One's Own Race by Participant Race in Study 2B



Figure 9. Opposition to Free Trade by Participant Race in Study 2B



Figure 10. Perceived Representation of Gender by Participant Gender, Study 3, Issue 1



Figure 11. Support for Discount Cards by Gender Condition and Poll Condition, Study 3



Figure 12. Perceived Representation of Gender by Participant Gender, Study 3, Issue 2



Figure 12. Perceived Representation of Gender by Participant Gender, Study 3, Issue 2



Figure 13. Support for Enacting More Equal Laws by Participant Gender in Study 3



Figure 14. Perceived Representation of Gender by Participant Gender, Gender Relevance, and Gender Majority Condition, Study 3



Figure 15. Bandwagoning by Participant Gender, Gender Relevance, and Gender Majority Condition, Study 3

Appendix A
Manipulations Study 1

Instructions: As part of this study, we're interested in how people understand information from polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You'll be asked about the poll later.

The latest national survey by Pew Research Center asked 1,002 American adults their response to the following question:

In response to a court order tied to ongoing FBI investigation of San Bernardino attacks, Apple should:

[Condition 1]



Americans' Opinions	
Should not unlock iPhone	61%
Should unlock iPhone	36%
Don't know	3%

[Condition 2]



Americans' Opinions	
Should not unlock iPhone	36%
Should unlock iPhone	61%
Don't know	3%

Appendix B
Questions for Study 1

According to the poll you just read, which position do most Americans support?

Should not unlock iPhone
Should unlock iPhone
Don't know

Which position do you support?

1	2	3	4	5	6
Should not unlock iPhone					Should unlock iPhone

When did you decide your stance on this issue?

Just now
In the last 3 days
In the last week
In the last month
Before that

What is your opinion of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mostly Unfavorable						Mostly Favorable

Apple
The Department of Justice

Some cellphones are called "smartphones" because of certain features they have. Is your cellphone a smartphone such as an iPhone, Android, Blackberry or Windows phone?

Yes, I have an iPhone
Yes, I have a smartphone other than an iPhone
No, I have a cellphone that is not a smartphone
No, I do not have a cellphone

How much if anything, have you heard about a federal court ordering Apple to help the FBI unlock an iPhone used by one of the suspects in the San Bernardino terrorist attacks? Have you heard:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A lot						Nothing at all

How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Very Much

To what extent is the poll a good representation of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Representative						Extremely Representative

White Americans
Black Americans
Asian Americas
Latino/a Americans

Appendix C
Manipulations Study 2A

Instructions: As part of this study, we're interested in how people understand information from polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You'll be asked about the poll later.

The latest national poll by Gallup asked 1,002 American adults their response to the following question:

Assuming there would be no change in Social Security benefits for those who are now age 55 or older, do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea to increase the age at which people are eligible to receive full benefits?

[Condition 1]



Americans' Opinions about Increasing the Eligibility Age for Full Social Security Benefits	
Good idea	63%
Bad idea	34%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 2]



Americans' Opinions about Increasing the Eligibility Age for Full Social Security Benefits	
Good idea	34%
Bad idea	63%
No opinion	3%

Appendix D
Study 2A Questions

According to the poll you just read, which position do most Americans support?

Increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits
Do not increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits
Don't know

Which position do you support?

1	2	3	4	5	6
Increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits					Do not increase the eligibility age for full social security benefits

When did you decide your stance on this issue?

Just now
In the last 3 days
In the last week
In the last month
Before that

What is your opinion of the Social Security System?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mostly Unfavorable						Mostly Favorable

How much if anything, have you heard about increasing the eligibility age for full social security benefits? Have you heard:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A lot						Nothing at all

How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Very Much

To what extent is the poll a good representation of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Representative						Extremely Representative

White Americans
Black Americans
Asian Americas
Latino/a Americans

Appendix E
Manipulations Study 2B

Instructions: As part of this study, we're interested in how people understand information from polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result. You'll be asked about the poll later.

The PEW Research Center asked 2,001 American adults their response to the following question:

In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America are a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?

[Condition 1]



Americans' Opinions about Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and Other North American Countries	
Good idea	72%
Bad idea	25%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 2]



Americans' Opinions about Free Trade Agreements between the U.S. and Other North American Countries	
Good idea	25%
Bad idea	72%
No opinion	3%

Appendix F
Study 2B Questions

According the poll you just read, what do most Americans think of free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America?

They are a good thing
They are a bad thing
No opinion

Which position do you support?
In general, do you think that free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America are a good thing or a bad thing for the United States?

1	2	3	4	5	6
Good thing					Bad Thing

When did you decide your stance on this issue?

Just now
In the last 3 days
In the last week
In the last month
Before that

What is your opinion of free trade?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Mostly Unfavorable						Mostly Favorable

How much if anything, have you heard about free trade agreements between the U.S. and other countries in North America? Have you heard:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
A lot						Nothing at all

How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Very Much

To what extent is this PEW poll a good representation of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Representative						Extremely Representative

White Americans
Black Americans
Asian Americas
Latino/a Americans

Appendix G
Manipulations Study 3

Instructions: As part of this study, we're interested in how people understand information from polls. Please take a minute to examine the following poll result, presented as both a table and a graph. You'll be asked about the poll later.

The latest national poll by Gallup asked 1,002 American adults their response to the following question:

A grocery store has offered you a free loyalty card that will save you money on your purchases. In exchange, the store will keep track of your shopping habits and sell this data to third parties.

Would this scenario be acceptable to you or not?

[Condition 1]: Majority Women; Majority Unacceptable

Sample Characteristics	
Women	68%
Men	32%



Should grocery stores sell data to third parties from loyalty discount card information?	
Acceptable	25%
Unacceptable	72%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 2]: Majority Women; Majority Acceptable

Sample Characteristics

Women	68%
Men	32%



Should grocery stores sell data to third parties from loyalty discount card information?	
Acceptable	72%
Unacceptable	25%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 3]: Minority Women; Majority Unacceptable

Sample Characteristics

Women	32%
Men	68%



Should grocery stores sell data to third parties from loyalty discount card information?	
Acceptable	25%
Unacceptable	72%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 4]: Minority Women; Majority Acceptable

Sample Characteristics

Women	32%
Men	68%



Should grocery stores sell data to third parties from loyalty discount card information?	
Acceptable	72%
Unacceptable	25%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 5]: Majority Women; Majority Current Laws

Sample Characteristics

Women	68%
Men	32%



Should the government enact more laws to ensure women and men receive equal pay in workplaces?	
Enact more laws	28%
Current laws are about right	69%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 6]: Majority Women; Majority Enact more Laws

Sample Characteristics

Women	68%
Men	32%



Should the government enact more laws to ensure women and men receive equal pay in workplaces?	
Enact more laws	69%
Current laws are about right	28%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 7]: Minority Women; Majority Current Laws

Sample Characteristics

Women	32%
Men	68%



Should the government enact more laws to ensure women and men receive equal pay in workplaces?	
Enact more laws	28%
Current laws are about right	69%
No opinion	3%

[Condition 8]: Minority Women; Majority Enact more Laws

Sample Characteristics

Women	32%
Men	68%



Should the government enact more laws to ensure women and men receive equal pay in workplaces?	
Enact more laws	69%
Current laws are about right	28%
No opinion	3%

Appendix H
Study 3 Issue Questions

According the poll you just read, which position do most people support?

Unacceptable
Acceptable
No opinion

Which position do you support?

1	2	3	4	5	6
Unacceptable					Acceptable

When did you decide your stance on this issue?

Just now
In the last 3 days
In the last week
In the last month
Before that

How much have you heard about this issue?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nothing at all						A lot

How important is this issue to you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Important						Very Important

How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Very Much

To what extent does this Gallup poll a good representation of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Representative						Extremely Representative

Men
Women

How important is this issue to:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Important						Very Important

Men
Women

According the poll you just read, which position do most people support?

Current laws are about right
Enact more laws
No opinion

Which position do you support?

1	2	3	4	5	6
Current laws are about right					Enact more laws

When did you decide your stance on this issue?

Just now
In the last 3 days
In the last week
In the last month
Before that

How much have you heard about this issue?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Nothing at all						A lot

How important is this issue to you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Important						Very Important

How much did the poll information factor into your own opinions?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all						Very Much

To what extent does this Gallup poll a good representation of:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Representative						Extremely Representative

Men
Women

How important is this issue to:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at all Important						Very Important

Men
Women

Appendix I
Identification Questionnaires

Please rate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements using the scale provided.

American identification:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

____1. I am glad to be American
____2. I think that Americans have a lot to be proud of.
____3. The fact that I am an American is an important part of my identity.

Racial identification:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

____1. I am glad to be a White/Black/Latino(a)/Asian American
____2. I think that White/Black/Latino(a)/Asian Americans have a lot to be proud of.
____3. The fact that I am White/Black/Latino(a)/Asian American is an important part of my identity.

Gender identification:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

____1. I am glad to be male/female
____2. I think that males/females have a lot to be proud of.
____3. The fact that I am a male/female is an important part of my identity.

Appendix J
Demographics

I am (circle one): Male / Female

I am _____ years old

Please check which group you consider yourself to be a member of:

White
African American/Black
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Native American
Multi-racial (please specify)_____
Other (please specify)_____

I consider myself:

					Moderate						
Liberal	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Conservative

					Independent						
Republican	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Democrat

[M-turk Questions Only]

Were you born in the U.S.?

Yes
No

Are you a citizen of the U.S.?

Yes
No

In what state do you currently live? (If not in the U.S. please leave blank)

What is your household's average yearly income level?

Below $25,000	$25,000-$50,000	$50,000-$100,000	$100,000-$200,000	$200,000 and above